

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETENTION DECISIONS OF FEMALE SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS

by

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March 2003

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**FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETENTION DECISIONS OF FEMALE
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS**

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, the Surface Warfare Community has had a problem with retention. The Surface Warfare Community continues to exhibit the lowest retention rate among all of the Navy's Unrestricted Line Communities. Since the drawdown in the early 1990's, the number of officers in the community continuing on through the Department Head level has dropped off dramatically. One of the major challenges throughout the past decade for the community has been to retain enough senior lieutenants to meet department head requirements. In FY 97, only 23.4 percent of the officers in the community attended Department Head School. In FY 98 and 99, the retention rate rose to 25 and 24.1 percent, respectively. (SWO Retention Power Point Brief 1999)

In 1999, the Navy implemented the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) that offered a bonus of \$50,000 to officers who attended Department Head School and committed to an additional 36-month (as a three-year tour or two 18-month) department head tour. This appears to have a positive effect on retention as retention in FY 00 reached 26.6 percent. Required retention over the next five years is expected to be between 34 and 38 percent, depending on the size of the year group.

Among the officers in the later year groups are female Surface Warfare Officers who, since 1994, have been given the opportunity to have a career path similar to their male counterparts as they were permitted to serve on combatants. Women currently make up about 11.5 percent of the officer community. Although the percentages in the senior ranks, Captain and Commander, are small, 1.6 and 2.4 percent respectively, females comprise 24.5 of the ensigns in the community.

Officer retention is critical to maintaining the Navy's force structure. Retention is still below the required steady-state levels. It is essential for the Navy to pay attention to the issues that are causing the junior officers to leave the Navy. As female junior officers now comprise one-quarter of the officers attending Surface Warfare Officer Division

Officer Course, it may also be beneficial for the Navy to assess the concerns that may be unique to females in the community.

B. PURPOSE

The goal of this thesis is to qualitatively identify factors that contribute to the retention decisions of female Surface Warfare Officers. The Surface Warfare Community is examined due to a recent focus on retention in the community, as well as initiatives implemented to increase retention in the community. Female officers in the community were chosen as the participants due to the drastic increase in their participation in the community, and the recent policy changes that have afforded them increased opportunity. It is important to identify the issues that cause officers to leave the navy, but with a growing pool of women in the community, it is also essential to address the issues that may be unique or more complicated for women.

C. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses qualitative research methods and inductive research analysis to identify overarching themes generated from interviews conducted with female Surface Warfare Officers. Interviews were conducted with 12 senior female Surface Warfare Officers and 15 junior female Surface Warfare Officers. The interview protocol uses 20 questions for senior officers and 21 questions for junior officers that identify the issues that contributed to senior officers choosing to stay in the navy, and the issues and factors that influence the retention decisions of junior female Surface Warfare Officers. The constant comparison method is used to develop themes that are supported with direct quotations from the interview data.

D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY

This thesis provides a better understanding of the factors and issues that contribute to the retention decisions of female junior Surface Warfare Officers, and also the unique issues that may be faced by female Surface Warfare Officers in their career decisions. It provides potential insight into the problems in the community so that

potential strategies or initiatives can be developed to positively impact the concerns that female junior officers have that cause them to leave the community.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II is divided into two parts: a history of women in the military, and a review of literature related to retention. Chapter III details the sample population, interview protocol, data collection procedures and research methodologies utilized. Chapter IV presents the themes developed from the data analysis along with quotations from the interview data for support. Chapter V provides a summary and conclusions for the study, policy recommendations based on the research, and topics for further research.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. OVERVIEW

The first part of this chapter documents a brief history of women in the military from their inception in the Nurse Corps prior to World War I to the present day, and the policies that have had specific impact on the inclusion of women in the military. It is important to not only recognize the contributions of women in the military but also to understand the impediments and policies that have governed the service and contributions of women. Particular emphasis is focused on the Navy and the Surface Warfare Community beginning in the seventies so as to foster some degree of understanding as to the policy changes that were enacted that contributed to women becoming an integral part of the community today.

The second part of this chapter analyzes two models of retention: the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model of Warner and Goldberg (Warner and Goldberg 1984) and the Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover by Lee and Mitchell (Lee and Mitchell 1994). Studies encompassing factors that contribute to the retention decisions of female Surface Warfare Officers and how these factors impact the retention models are discussed in detail.

B. HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Throughout the history of the United States, women have made invaluable contributions to the military. Women have contributed to the defense of the land even prior to birth of the country. As Lewis asserts, “they have contributed their talents skills and courage to this endeavor for more than two centuries with an astounding record of achievement that stretches from Lexington and Concord to the Persian Gulf and beyond.” (Lewis 1999, 9)

This chapter’s history begins following the Spanish-American War, when the contributions of the women who served in the health care field was formally recognized as essential to the military. In 1901 Congress established the Army Nurse Corps, followed in 1908, the Navy Nurse Corps. Although the status of the nurses was still as an

auxiliary role to the military, as they were appointed, not commissioned, and had no military rank, equal pay or benefits, they were now an official part of the Army and Navy. (Dean 1997, 4)

1. World War I

Women participated again in the military primarily to alleviate severe personnel shortages and to render men able to go into combat. Many women also contributed in the field of health care. The Nurse Corps was already established in both the Navy and Army and many women served in the war as nurses. By the end of the war, the Army Nurse Corps had expanded from 400 to 20,000 and the Navy Nurse Corps from 460 to 1,400. (Holm 1982, 10) The Navy Nurse Corps remained fairly small as the opportunities for overseas service was limited due to the number of facilities.

Women were able to take on additional roles as well. In 1917, the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels authorized the enlistment of women into the Naval Reserve as yeomen or other such ratings of the clerical nature that were deemed essential. Officially women were enlisted as yeomen (F), but were more commonly referred to as yeomenettes. The primary impetus for enlisting the women was to engage them in clerical work ashore to release men to go to sea. Over 12,000 women enlisted in the Navy during the war. Some served with hospital units in France, others with intelligence groups in Puerto Rico, but most remained stateside. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 3)

Aside from the Nurse Corps, the Army did not enlist women during the war. The Army did, however, employ 220 women as Signal Corps telephone operators to implement the secure telephone network for the American Expeditionary Forces in France and England. These women became known as the “Hello Girls.” (Lewis 1999, 53,62)

The Marine Corps did not enlist women until August 1918, when 300 women joined the Marines. These women were dubbed “marinettes.” (Holm 1982, 12) These women were similar to the yeomenettes and were employed in mostly clerical positions.

Following the war, all of the enlisted women in the Navy, Coast Guard and Marines were demobilized. The nurses remained with the military, but were reduced to their peacetime numbers and lacked full military status.

2. World War II

Once again as the nation began the rapid mobilization for war, it faced a severe personnel shortage. The overwhelming necessity for large numbers of men in combat left a significant dearth of personnel in support roles. Women were vital to the war efforts as the population of available men was insufficient. In part to assuage the shortfall, numerous efforts were made to incorporate women into the military ranks. In May 1942, President Roosevelt signed a bill that established the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). The WAAC was not officially part of the Army, merely a women's organization created to serve with the Army. (Lewis 1999, 74) The women in the WAAC did not receive equal pay, did not receive entitlements for dependents, and did not hold military rank. The inequality caused by the establishment of the organization led to a great deal of resistance within the Army and numerous problems. The auxiliary nature of the Corps did not allow for military control over the members, there was no contract that kept women from leaving, and the legal and medical benefits afforded to the women were not commensurate with their male counterparts in the Army. (Devilbiss 1990, 7). To combat this problem, the Women's Army Corps (WAC) was established in June 1943. Through the WAC, women became an official part of the Army and received full military status.

The Navy followed close behind and established the Navy Women's Reserve in July 1942. The Navy resorted to enlisting women to release men for duty with the fleet and to man forward bases. (Holm 1992, 26) The Navy women were known as WAVES, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service. They were established as part of the Naval Reserve, not as a separate women's corps although the acronym led to the perception of a separate organization. (Devilbiss 1990, 7) They were enlisted and commissioned in corresponding ranks and ratings to the Regular Navy. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 39)

The Coast Guard, which was part of the Navy Department during the war, established the women's reserve in November 1942. The Coast Guard Women's Reserve was called SPAR, a derivative of the Coast Guard motto, "Semper Paratus- Always Ready." (Holm 1992, 27) The Marine Corps was authorized to establish a women's reserve under the same law as the Navy reserve, but did not actually create the Marine Corps Women's Reserve until February 1943. The nucleus for both the SPARs and Women Marines was from the Navy WAVES program. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 57)

The primary constraint on women in the Navy Department was the law prohibiting them from serving outside the contiguous United States. It was later amended so that women could serve in Hawaii, Alaska, the Caribbean, and Panama. This however did not apply to the WACs or the nurses. (Holm 1992, 63) The legislation establishing the WAVES also limited the number of women who could serve as officers. Only one woman could hold the rank of lieutenant commander, 34 as lieutenants, and of the rest, only 35-percent could be lieutenant, junior grade. This severely stifled promotions. This law was amended in 1943, and it allowed for one woman to be appointed captain and removed restrictions in the lower ranks. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 89)

Although women were a vital addition to the war effort, they were limited in what they could do. They could only serve ashore, they only had authority over other women, and most began their involvement in the military in some form of administrative capacity. After proving themselves, and again to ameliorate the personnel shortages, women became involved in specialized training that led to such jobs as communications watch officers, radio-radar administrators, air transport officers, and aviators. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 59)

The aviation components of the services were typically more willing to integrate women. Almost half of the women in the Army, about 40,000, served as Air-WACs. The Army also employed women pilots in a civil service status to ferry military aircraft, tow air gunnery targets, and teach flying. (Holm 1992, 64). These women were referred to as WASPs, Women's Airforce Service Pilots, and did virtually everything that male pilots did during World War II, except combat. (Lewis 1999, 82) About one quarter of

the WAVES, nearly 23,000, served in the aviation component, and about one third of the women Marines served in the aviation field.

One of the roles of women in the Army Auxiliary Corps during World War II was the manning of forward bases. The first five WAC female officers arrived in North Africa in December 1942, followed by the first enlisted women in January 1943. They were eventually stationed throughout Europe, the largest overseas deployment of women, and the Southwestern Pacific. WACs moved with forces to Sicily, Italy, France on Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) during the invasion of Normandy, and then to Paris and Germany. The first WACs arrived in Australia in May 1944 and then moved on to New Guinea, Hollandia, and the Philippines. (Holm 1992, 86) Despite some of the harsh and rigid conditions particularly on the Pacific Front, as Holm notes, “morale overseas was high because the women felt that they were needed and that they were contributing directly to the war effort.” (Holm 1992, 83) Women, amongst other things, served as typists, stenographers, translators, drivers, telephone operators, cooks, saboteurs, cartographers, cryptographers and propagandists. At peak strength, there were over 17,000 WACs serving overseas, and by the end of the war over 5,000 WAVES, Women Marines or SPARs were serving in Hawaii or Alaska.

Women again contributed immeasurably to the war effort through their contribution in the health care field. Army nurses were the first women to arrive overseas. Sixty army nurses landed with assault troops in North Africa in November 1942 and set up a surgical hospital. Nurses followed troops throughout the European and Pacific fronts, working under heavy fire in such locations as Anzio, Guam, Midway and the Philippines. (Lewis 1999, 87) When the Philippines fell to the Japanese in May 1942, 11 Navy nurses and 66 army nurses were held on the Philippines in POW camps for 37 months. (Holm 1992, 91) Navy nurses also served at sea aboard 12 hospital ships, in air evacuation, and in numerous overseas locations. (Holm 1992, 92)

As Devilbiss asserts, “the major ideological breakthroughs regarding women and the military that came about during World War II were that women could be in the armed forces (wear uniforms and have military rank), and that their contributions could be important and continuing ones.” (Devilbiss 1990, 9) Over 350,000 women served in the

military during World War II. They were all volunteers and, with the exception of nurses, had served in programs literally started from scratch three years earlier. (Holm 1992, 100) By the summer of 1945, there were 100,000 WACs, 86,000 WAVES, 18,000 Women Marines, 11,000 SPARs, and 57,000 Army and 11,000 Navy Nurses. Despite their numerous contributions, as the war wound down, the need for women to augment the military decreased. The WASPs were disbanded in December 1944, the WAVES were discharged starting in August 1945, followed by the rapid demobilization of the other services. (Lewis 1999, 97) The Coast Guard however, was the only service that completely disbanded its women's component. The SPARs were demobilized in June 1946. (Holm 1992, 105)

Following World War II in June 1948, President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services' Integration Act of 1948 that established a permanent place for women in the regular and reserve components of the armed forces. However, Holm believes that "its final passage was due more to the prevailing military manpower philosophy than to concerns about women's right to serve." (Holm 1992, 114) Although the Integration Act established a permanent place for women in the military, it also imposed numerous restrictions on their participation in the services. The Act placed a two-percent ceiling on the number of women that could be on active duty in the regular component of each service, limited each service to only one colonel or captain with complete exclusion from flag rank, placed a ten-percent limit on the number of women lieutenant colonels and commanders, placed a 20-percent limit on the number of women lieutenant commanders in the Navy, and, except in the Air Force, placed women on a different promotion list. Additionally, the Act specifically restricted women from duty in aircraft while on a combat mission and service onboard ships in the navy, except transport and hospital ships. Beyond that, the service secretaries were authorized to determine the duty that women could serve in. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 124) The armed forces had joined together to support legislation to include women in the peacetime armed forces to alleviate problems that might arise if a full mobilization was required.

3. Korea

On 1 July 1950, the first US Army Combat Troops arrived in South Korea in response to the North Korean Communist Troops marching across the 38th parallel. (Holm 1992, 148) Four days later, 57 Army nurses landed in Pusan to establish a hospital. Within a month, there were over 100 nurses on duty in South Korea. The Army nurse corps grew from 3500 to nearly 5400 during the course of the Korean War. Navy nurses served in hospital ships including USS REPOSE, USS CONSOLATION and USS HAVEN. (Lewis 1999, 100) It is estimated that between 500 and 600 women nurses served in the war zone. (Holm 1992, 149)

As was the case during World War II, women replaced men in stateside billets so that men could serve in the combat arena. Women also served overseas, in Japan and the Philippines, in the WAC and Women in the Air Force (WAF) in direct support of the war. By June 1951, the women in the line component numbered 28,000, just over one percent of the total strength. Congress temporarily lifted the 2-percent cap in an attempt to bolster recruitment. (Holm 1992, 150)

In 1951, at the request of Anna Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Secretary of Defense George Marshall established the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). The committee was established to help the services recruit more women and to bolster women's programs. The first action of the committee was a joint campaign aimed at expanding, in ten months, the numbers of women in the military from 40,000 to 112,000. The effort failed and directly impacted the status of military women following the war. (Devilbiss 1990, 10)

Following the Korean War, the attitude towards women in the military was seen in a more negative light. This was influenced by the failure of the recruiting effort initiated by DACOWITS, the changing military strategy of the Cold War, the peacetime draft, societal attitudes regarding women, and the absence of any pressures to use women. (Holm 1992, 158) Two major policy changes resulted from the recruiting of women for the Korean War: the minimum age for enlistment in the Navy was lowered from 20 to 18 and married women could no longer seek resignation at their request. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 147)

4. The Sixties

In the early sixties, President Kennedy decided to “expand U.S. military forces to meet communist probes wherever and whenever necessary to show America’s resolve to stand firm.” (Holm 1992, 179) Troops were committed to West Berlin and Southeast Asia. The military continued to rely on conscription to provide the personnel needed to fill the ranks in supporting the war on communism. Women’s programs were sidelined, and actually continued to decline. Women were still limited in the opportunities for duty in the services. By 1965, enlisted women were only found in 36 of the 61 noncombatant occupational specialties. Nearly 70 percent were performing clerical and administrative work, and another 23 percent were in the healthcare profession. More than 75 percent of the women line officers were in administration, personnel, information, and similar desk jobs. (Holm 1992, 184)

The role of women in the military began to expand during the sixties based on personnel shortages associated with the Vietnam War, the increased role of women in the work force, and the more aggressive venue of feminism sparked by Betty Friedan and “The Feminine Mystique.” (Holm 1992, 186) In November 1967, President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 that removed some of the restrictions on female officers, including allowing for the promotion of women to flag rank, abolishing the ten-percent cap on women that could be promoted to lieutenant colonel and commander, equalizing retirement, and removing the two-percent ceiling on women in the services. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 180)

5. Vietnam

American military women served in Vietnam from the start of the conflict. The first WACs arrived for duty in 1966 at General Westmoreland’s headquarters in Saigon. The majority of the women who served in Vietnam were nurses. Army nurses were sent with medical units to support the troops in combat. In October 1965, USS REPOSE was commissioned and 29 Navy nurses were assigned for duty, and in 1966, USS SANTUARY was recommissioned with 29 nurses serving aboard. By February 1966, over 300 military nurses were serving in some capacity in Vietnam and Thailand. Some

nurses also worked with their Vietnamese counterparts in providing care to civilians, setting up medical facilities, training personnel, and providing care to South Vietnamese troops. (Holm 1992, 228) It is estimated that over 7500 American military women served in Southeast Asia over the course of the war. (Devilbiss 1990, 11) Approximately 500 WACs served tours in Vietnam as well as 36 women Marines, (Holm 1992, 214,217) and 9 female Navy line officers. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 173) According to Holm, the women who served in Vietnam proved that “the modern American woman is fully capable of functioning effectively in a combat environment, even under direct hostile fire.” (Holm 1992, 207)

6. The Seventies

The seventies were a decade of expansion for women in the military. One of the largest forces driving the increased participation of women in the military was the end of conscription and the establishment of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973. The AVF Task Force ordered the services to develop contingency plans for the increased inclusion of women. The combined service plans projected a total increase of nearly 170 percent. By June 1977, there were over 110,000 female line officers and enlisted troops on active duty. (Holm 1992, 250) Considerable debate ensued throughout the seventies over the meaning of the term combat. Each service had its own definition of what constituted combat. Law and/or policy excluded women from combat units and positions that required combat skills. Congress mandated that the DoD define combat and make recommendations on expanding the jobs to which women could be assigned. According to Holm, “in each instance, the services arrived at halfway measures that allowed women limited access without directly encroaching on the combat restrictions imposed by law and service policy.” (Holm 1992, 313) The lasting impact of the recommendations was significant as women gained access to jobs involving flying, missile duty, and seagoing assignments.

Throughout the early seventies, the military designed programs to enhance the inclusion of women in all but the combat and direct combat-support fields. This inclusion produced a more balanced distribution of women throughout the ranks. In

1969, the Air Force opened the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) to women, followed in 1972 by the Army and the Navy. By 1979, 20,000 women were enrolled in ROTC, 2,100 of whom were on scholarship. In 1973, the first coeducational class graduated from the Naval Officer Candidate School (OCS), followed by the Army in 1976. (Holm 1992, 270) In October 1975, President Ford signed the Public Law that permitted women to gain acceptance to the service academies. Women were admitted in the fall of 1976, and in 1980, the first co-ed classes graduated from the Army Military Academy, Naval Academy and Air Force Academy. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 221) In 1977, the separate WAC commissioning programs were discontinued, followed in 1978 by the disestablishment of the WAC and the inclusion of women into the male promotion lists. Women were included on the Navy and Marine Corps promotion lists in September 1981. (Holm 1992, 277)

Many of the restrictions and inequalities that women faced regarding family were also amended during the seventies. The Air Force changed policy so that pregnant women could seek reentry after being discharged, and women with children could be accepted for service. The other services followed suit. The Department of Defense also ordered that the separation of women for pregnancy and parenthood would no longer be mandatory, but on a voluntary basis. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 198) In 1973, the Supreme Court declared that it was unconstitutional for the military to require female members to prove the dependency status of their husbands and children.

One of the strongest proponents of women in the military was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In August 1972, Admiral Zumwalt issued Z-Gram Z-116 that expanded the role of women in the Navy. Under a pilot program, a limited number of officers and enlisted women were assigned to sea duty on a noncombatant, women could be assigned as commanding officers ashore, and women formally entered into the aviation community. In 1973, six Navy women earned their wings and were designated naval aviators. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 182) The Army and Air Force mirrored the strides by the Navy, and in 1974 the first women graduated from the Army's flight training class, followed in 1975 by the Air Force through their test program for female pilots and navigators in non-combat flying. (Holm 1992, 320)

For women in ships, Z-116 augmented women to the crew of USS SANTUARY, a hospital ship. Some of the women officers assigned to the ship earned their qualification as Officer of the Deck (OOD) underway, thus demonstrating that “not only could the ship handle women, but that women could handle the ship.” (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 241) The program was a huge success and paved the way for women serving aboard ships.

The federal courts served as a catalyst for many of the changes that the military faced in the seventies. Beginning in 1970, the services were hit with a series of lawsuits brought by military women who challenged the constitutionality of exclusion policies on the grounds of equal protection. (Holm 1992, 266) In November 1976 four enlisted women filed suit in U.S. District Court in Washington D.C. asking that the Navy policy prohibiting them from serving aboard major Navy ships be declared unconstitutional for not providing women equal protection under the law. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 242) In July 1978, Judge Sirica ruled on Owens vs. Brown, and ordered the Navy to proceed with “‘measured steps’ in a nondiscriminatory manner, making individualized decisions regarding women’s capabilities with respect to their roles in the Navy.” (Holm 1992, 332) The Court ruled that the Navy was permitted to determine how it would enact the inclusion of women, but that blanket exclusions would no longer be tolerated. (Holm 1992, 333) Following the ruling, in July 1978 the Navy sent five female ensigns to Surface Warfare Officer’s Division Officer Course. In the fall of 1978, the Navy began assigning women to noncombatant vessels and temporary duty, not to exceed 180 days, on combatants. The first wave of 16 officers and 375 enlisted women to be permanently assigned to Navy ships reported in November 1978 to ships such as USS VULCAN, USS L.Y. SPEAR, USS NORTON SOUND and USS SAMUEL GOMPERS. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 248)

Although the changes promulgated in Z-116 and by Congress were seemingly revolutionary and advanced women to a great degree in theory, it took the Navy 20 years to implement them fully. This occurred because the changes were extensive and required a great deal of training and assignment modification, women were reluctant to enter some of the nontraditional fields, and there was a great deal of resistance towards women in command. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 235)

7. The Eighties

A primary impetus for the expanded roles of women in the services during the eighties, again, was the projected personnel shortfalls. In 1981, the Reagan administration planned to expand the military by about 10 percent, which would amount to about 200,000 troops, as early as 1985. As Holm notes, “the meaning of combat exclusion was the common element driving decisions on military women in all the DoD services during the 1980s” (Holm 1992, 398)

The Army devised a system to classify battle areas. Once the areas were classified, women were assigned to areas that were not in combat or direct combat support. This classification procedure opened over 12,000 positions in the forward support battalions of the Army’s combat divisions. (Holm 1992, 406)

The Navy was concerned with planning for the projected 600 ship fleet. This planning called for the addition of 120 ships to the fleet as well as the officers and sailors to man the ships. (Holm 1992, 407) The Navy had the prerogative to designate ships combatants or noncombatants. Female numbers and recruiting goals were based on the number of billets on ships that women could serve on. Additionally, the Navy had to reserve enough shore billets for men to allow for time ashore between sea tours. (Holm 1992, 408) In the initial phase of the women in ships program, women were assigned primarily to repair ships, tenders, tugs and research vessels. As Holm found, “during the joint DoD Background Review, the Navy reported that the women in ships program had been an impressive success: ‘Navy women are routinely performing in both traditional and non-traditional areas with skill, confidence, and dedication and are contributing to the general operational effectiveness.’” (Holm 1992, 408) For female Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) in the late seventies and early eighties, although the number of billets at sea was slowly increasing, there were virtually no billets available for women to serve as executive and commanding officers. Many women left the community for the lack of a career path. Opportunities began to expand in 1984 when destroyer tenders and repair ships began to make six-month deployments, and more billets became available to women. In 1986, 17 billets for female SWOs opened in replenishment ships and maritime prepositioning squadrons. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 255)

In 1987, Secretary of the Navy James Webb ordered the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to convene a study group documenting the policies and opportunities afforded women in the Navy. The outcome of the study was The Navy Study Group's Report on Progress of Women in the Navy, based on which Secretary Webb initiated several major policy initiatives. Opportunities for women to go to sea opened as 26 of 37 ships in the Combat Logistics Force were designated noncombatants. These included oilers, ammunition ships and stores ships. Secretary Webb also took action to correct and prevent sexual harassment, fraternization, and inequality in job opportunities. A full time captain's position was also created as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Personnel for Women's Policy. (Holm 1992, 413) In June 1987, the destroyer tender USS ACADIA sailed into the Persian Gulf to repair USS STARK from damage caused by Iraqi missiles. There were 248 women onboard, accounting for 25-percent of the crew. (Holm 1992, 414)

The impact of these changes was extremely positive for women and was reflected in the increased retention rates. The opportunities for command were now open, and the opportunities for promotion for females were commensurate with their male peers. In 1983, the first female SWOs were screened to become executive officers. The first woman executive officer was LT Susan Cowar, who assumed the duties as executive officer aboard a fleet tug assigned to Naval Reserve forces. The first woman to command a ship was LCDR Darlene Iskra, who in 1990, assumed command of USS OPPORTUNE, a rescue and diving ship, followed by CDR Deborah Gernes who assumed command of USS CIMARRON, a fleet oiler in 1991. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 262)

The Navy also took strides to provided additional opportunities to women in the aviation field. In 1981 the Navy opened its jet-training pipeline to five women a year. They were required to first complete the propeller syllabus and receive their wings, and then they were eligible to apply for transition. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 274)

The Marine Corps was also progressive in opening opportunities for women. In the late seventies, women were assigned to the Fleet Marine Force in Combat Service Support and aviation elements. The only limits placed on women in the Corps were that

they could not be assigned to infantry, artillery, tank, or assault amphibian units, nor could they serve as pilots or naval flight officers. (Holm 1992, 416)

The Coast Guard was perhaps the most progressive of the services in regards to the opportunities for women. By 1978, the Coast Guard had no arbitrary restrictions based on gender, and by the end of the eighties, vessels of almost every class were going to sea with both males and females. Women were commanding cutters, participating in boarding parties, and operating law enforcement and search and rescue aircraft. There were, however, limitations placed on enlisted women because of the size of the platforms. (Holm 1992, 422)

8. Grenada and Panama

In October 1983, President Reagan ordered military troops into the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, which had been taken over a year earlier by Cuban-backed communist insurgents. After initial attack by Navy SEALs and Army paratroopers, backup units, which included women, arrived on the island. Over 170 women participated in Operation Urgent Fury. (Lewis 1999, 133) They routinely went to Grenada and performed their jobs under combat conditions. They drove trucks, loaded supplies and ammunition, guarded gates, served as military police, and did whatever “noncombatant” things they were assigned to do. (Dean 1997, 25)

In 1989, U.S. troops were deployed to Panama in efforts to overthrow the government of Manuel Noreiga. Approximately 800 women served in the invasion of Panama as integral members of primarily the Army and Air Force. Among other assignments, they served in Army infantry, Intelligence, and Special Operations, and in the Air Force as aircraft commanders, pilots, navigators and flight engineers. Captain Linda Brey led 30 soldiers of her Military Police Company to seize the enemy objective of a military kennel near Panama City. She and her troops engaged in a three-hour firefight before securing the objective. Women comprised four percent of the 18,400 troops that served in the invasion of Panama. (Francke 1997, 46)

9. Gulf War

Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield were the first major military deployments since Vietnam, and the largest deployment of military women. During the war, women in the military participated in almost every fashion on land, sea and in the air, except in the actual fighting. (Holm 1992, 445) In the Navy, although women were not permitted to serve onboard combatants, they were assigned to ships in the Gulf that provided supplies, ammunition and repair. In September 1990, USS ACADIA sailed into the Persian Gulf with a crew of 900 men and 360 women. ACADIA was hailed as the first war-time test of a ship operating with a gender-integrated crew. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 287) USS YELLOWSTONE, USS CAPE COD and numerous other ships of the Combat Logistics Force and Military Sealift Command steamed in the Gulf with integrated crews. Additionally, the Navy's job continued long after the combat ended as ships and sailors remained on station in remote areas on routine deployments. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 286)

In July 1991, the Pentagon reported that approximately 41,000 women had served in the Persian Gulf arena. This accounted for roughly 7.2 percent of the deployed forces. (Holm 1992, 469) Women served in medical facilities on land and at sea. The Army, Navy and Air Force combined medical efforts in mobile medical units. Women also served on the two navy hospital ships, USS MERCY and USS COMFORT, which remained in the Gulf. (Lewis 1999, 146)

Although a large death toll was predicted, only 50 combat deaths occurred. (Lewis 1999, 146) Of these, 13 were women. Additionally, two women were among the 25 U.S. personnel captured and taken as prisoners of war. Holm believes that "the general reaction was that the men and women in the Gulf had chosen to serve their country and some had made the ultimate sacrifice. There were no claims that any one life was more precious than another." (Holm 1992, 464) The Gulf War brought the issue of women in combat to the forefront.

10. Nineties

By 1994, a great deal of progress had been made in incorporating women into combat units in the Navy. A couple of the driving factors behind these changes were the incidents at the Tailhook Convention in 1991, which compelled the Navy to examine the opportunities for women, and the Gulf War, which proved that women were capable of serving in a combat environment. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 313)

One of the chief successes for women in the nineties came in the form of the repeal of combat exclusions. The first direct challenge to the combat exclusions came in May 1991 when the House Armed Services Committee voted to allow women to fly combat missions in the Air Force, Navy and Marines. (Holm 1992, 475) Support for the repeal was driven by an amendment cosponsored by Representatives Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado) and Beverly B. Byron (D-Maryland) that would allow women to fly military combat missions. (Holm 1992, 475) Originally, Representative Schroeder and her collaborators specifically targeted the 1948 statute that prohibited women from flying aircraft engaged in combat missions as the focal point for attacking the combat exclusion laws. The Air Force policies were seemingly the easiest to attack because, unlike the Navy, they did not incorporate additional policy restrictions such as allowing women on combatant vessels. (Francke 1997, 221) When Representative Byron added her support, the proposal was revised to include Naval aviation as well. (Francke 1997, 222) Following hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 1992, the proposal for pilot repeal seemed to lose merit and dropped off the defense authorization bill. This change brought about increased vigor and support from military members, particularly pilots in the Navy and Air Force. As a result, Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and William Roth (R-Delaware) reactivated the repeal as an amendment to the 1992 Defense Authorization Bill. (Francke 1997, 239) After considerable debate, Congress passed the 1992 Defense Authorization Bill, which included the amendment, and in December 1991, President George Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which included provisions to repeal the ban on women flying combat missions. (Holm 1992, 473) Although the legal prohibitions against women flying combat aircraft were rescinded, a presidential

commission was established to define how the services would integrate women into the new roles and assignments. (Francke 1997, 240)

In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered the services to drop the restrictions that prohibited women from flying combat missions. The CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, promptly allowed qualified female pilots and naval flight officers access to all shore based aviation units. When women were finally allowed assignment to combatant ships in 1993, women were also granted assignment to tactical aircraft. In the spring of 1994, USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER was the first aircraft carrier to deploy with women permanently assigned as part of the crew and embarked airwing. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 315) Also in 1994, the Navy notified Congress that women would be assigned as permanent crewmembers to three carriers, three destroyers, and two dock landing ships. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 325) In September of 1996, USS LABOON was the first ship to launch offensive weapons with an integrated crew as she fired Tomahawk missiles at targets in Iraq. In 1998, the Navy selected six women to command combatants. (Ebbert and Hall 1999, 331)

According to the Defense Manpower Data Center, over 1,000 women participated in U.S. military operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. In 1995, over 1,200 were deployed to Haiti for peacekeeping duties. To date, over 5,000 women have served in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

11. Present Day

According to the Women's Research and Education Institute, as of May 1999, there were 190,808 women on active duty in the Department of Defense. As of December 2000, there were 382,365 personnel on active duty in the Navy, of which 54,142, or 14.2 percent were women. Of the 54,985 officers on duty, 8,008, or 14.6 percent, were women. According to data obtained from the Surface Warfare Community Manager, there are currently 8078 officers in the Surface Warfare pipeline. Of these, 914, or 11.3 percent are female. Currently, all of the ships in the Navy are open to females except for submarines and coastal patrol (PC) ships. There are 643 officers serving aboard combatants and an additional 66 on noncombatants.

As Lewis states, “women have taken up arms, fought, and died in virtually every armed conflict in the nation’s history. By the end of the 1990s, it was no longer a question of whether women could serve on the battlefield, it was a question of whether they should. Although this question is still being debated, what cannot be questioned are the real experiences, sacrifices, and contributions of the women who have served.” (Lewis 1999, 155)

C. RETENTION STUDIES

Studies conducted regarding occupational retention often seek to discover the various causes that impact an individual’s decision to either remain in a current job or to seek employment elsewhere. The Surface Warfare Community in the Navy is particularly interested in factors affecting retention due to severe personnel shortfalls and under manning. Since Department Head Year Group 1993, actual manning levels at Department Head School have continually fallen short of the levels required. In Department Head Year Group 1995, the actual retention level of officers remaining in the Navy and attending Department Head School was at a low of 16.6 percent. Although retention rates and percentages of officers attending Department Head School are now on the rise, the rates are still below the level required, which is projected at about 35 percent. The Surface Warfare Continuation Pay and the adjustment in the career path that allows for division officers to roll into Department Head School early have contributed to this rise in retention rate. The actual retention rate of those going to Department Head School in 1999 was 24.1 percent, whereas in 2000, the percentage rose to 32.8 percent. Contributing to this percentage were 48 “early rollers”, division officers going straight to Department Head School, in a class of 251. (SWO Retention Power Point Brief 1999)

Two models that explain factors that contribute to retention are the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model (Warner and Goldberg 1984) and the Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover (Lee and Mitchell 1994). A brief overview of both models will be provided. Studies and research encompassing additional factors that weigh into the economic and non-pecuniary factors of the Warner-Goldberg ACOL model, as well as the “shocks” that are part of the Lee and Mitchell Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover are also discussed in detail.

1. Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model

One of the basic concepts of many retention studies is from the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model. The ACOL model, as related to the Navy, proposes that an individual will make a decision to either stay in the Navy or leave based on the perceived costs and benefits of both life in the Navy and the civilian world. The model stipulates that a decision will be made based on both monetary and non-pecuniary factors. (Warner and Goldberg 1984)

The model is used to assess how an individual will assess his/her reenlistment decision at the end of his/her first term of military service. The model specifically considers enlisted personnel at the end of their first term of military service. An individual decides to stay or leave by comparing the utility associated with leaving immediately and the utility associated with remaining in the military for specified periods of time. The individual decides to stay or leave based on a comparison between present and future monetary earnings and military “taste factors”, and the potential earnings and “taste factors” gained from pursuing a career in the civilian sector. The “taste factors” are monetary equivalents of the non-pecuniary factors associated with the different lifestyles. The model incorporates an individual’s military pay, yearly retirement pay based on continued service and life expectancy, future civilian earnings should the individual leave immediately or after a certain period, and the “taste” factors associated with a career in the military or civilian sector. Although the non-pecuniary factors are assessed a monetary value, the values will differ depending on an individual’s values and needs at given periods of time. The model purports that an individual will likely remain in the military if the annualized cost of leaving is greater than the net taste for civilian life over military life. (Warner and Goldberg 1984, 27)

The study analyzed the effect of sea duty on the location and elasticity of the reenlistment supply curve, as “in the U.S. Navy sea duty is the major non-pecuniary element influencing reenlistment decisions of enlisted personnel.” (Warner and Goldberg 1984, 26) The theory suggests that sea duty does alter the supply curve, and the time spent in sea duty has a highly significant effect on the first-term enlistment rate. This concept is very significant to the retention of Surface Warfare Officers, as the majority of

a Surface Warfare Officer's initial obligation is spent at sea. Appendix A details the typical career path for Surface Warfare Officers. Conventional Surface Warfare Officers typically have an initial obligation of 4 years if they ascended from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or Officer Candidate School, and 5 years if they ascended from the United States Naval Academy (USNA). The majority of this time for SWOs, as seen in Appendix A, will be spent in a sea-going billet.

The ACOL model does, however, stipulate that although sea duty has a negative effect on reenlistment, the negative impact can be counteracted with bonuses. Thus, the basic premise of the ACOL model is that if the Navy can adequately compensate individuals through both pecuniary and non-pecuniary measures, the Navy can increase the individual's desire to remain in the service, and offset the desire to pursue opportunities outside the military.

2. Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover

Another model that incorporates the push-pull theory of employee turnover is the Unfolding Model Of Voluntary Employee Turnover presented by Lee and Mitchell. The major components of the model include "shocks" to the employee, jarring events that serve as the impetus for considering alternate employment, and the psychological analysis that precedes a decision to quit and the act of quitting. Shocks can be positive, neutral, or negative and can be job-related factors or non job-related. The model proposes that employee turnover can be categorized into four distinct decision paths that involve distinctive foci, psychological processes, and external events. Decision Path 1 specifies that a shock to the system elicits a recollection of a similar shock, situation, and response. The recollection elicits thought about the circumstances, plausible actions given the circumstances, and expected consequences of these actions. If a relevant past experience or script exists, a match occurs, and the response (e.g., staying or leaving) is 'enacted'. In Decision Path 2, a shock causes an employee to reassess the desire to remain in the current organization. The assessment and decision occur in the absence of specific job alternatives. In Decision Path 3, a shock causes the employee to assess the desire to leave the current organization. In Decision Path 4 no shock is present, but over

time an employee may believe that he/she no longer fits in the job because of perceived discrepancies in values or goals. (Lee and Mitchell, 1996) As Powell and Mainiero note, “what seems to matter most to women and men in evaluating their careers and lives is whether they see themselves successful *on their own terms*.” (Powell and Mainiero 1993, 210)

Employee turnover is a complex process in which individuals assess their feelings, personal situation, and work environment and then make decisions about staying or leaving an organization. In some cases, the employee simply leaves a job because the shock results in a scripted behavior, or a preconceived notion of how the employee would like to alter the course of his/her life because of the shock, without regards for evaluating the current or alternative jobs. The employee leaves the organization without considering alternatives; his/her central choice is either to stay or leave the present organization. In most cases, however, the employee makes decisions about staying with or leaving an organization based on fit or compatibility criterion, rather than on maximizing their subjective expected utilities. (Lee and Mitchell, 1994)

3. Application to Female Surface Warfare Officers

Factors that have an impact on an officer’s decision to either stay or leave are numerous. Economic factors, “taste factors” associated with Navy life, family issues, and leadership all serve as elements that may factor into an individual’s decision to either stay in or leave the Navy. Although many of the issues are common for all Surface Warfare Officers, references and commentary will be offered as to how certain aspects relate to the female officers in the community.

a. Economic Factors

According to the ACOL model, the Navy can compensate individuals through bonuses and pay. Research conducted by Mackin and Darling regarding the proposed career incentive pay for Surface Warfare Officers concluded that a career incentive pay would yield significant cost savings while improving the Navy’s ability to attract and retain high quality officers. (Mackin and Darling 1996, 13) The bonus was

enacted in 1999, and as of 15 Jan 01, 1419 SWOs accepted the bonus. The Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) is an incentive bonus that pays a SWO up to a total of \$50,000 to remain in the community and on active duty to complete two afloat Department Head tours.

In a recent survey conducted with Junior Surface Warfare Officers, although many noted that their main concerns and reasons for contemplating ending their service in the Navy was not about money, many felt it unfair that a Surface Warfare Officer had to wait three years to qualify for sea pay and that the retirement system is all or nothing. As Natter, Lopez and Hodges explained, “Many JOs consider benefits and compensation much less important than other retention drivers, but when taken together with” other non-pecuniary factors, “benefits become the ‘tie breaker’- and they tip the balance toward leaving the Navy.” (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 61)

On the economic side is also the potential pull of the overall economy. “A striking reality is that the market will ultimately determine the movement of your employees.” (Cappelli 2000, 104) Although a corporation, or the military, can potentially correct internal problems that cause people to leave, they cannot counter the pull of the market or shield workers from compelling opportunities and aggressive recruiters. Corporations, and the military, can however influence who leaves and when, and one mechanism for achieving that is through compensation. Bonuses tend to be an effective way to keep talent in place during critical periods. (Cappelli 2000, 105)

Although the importance of economic factors are not limited to female officers, but are issues for every officer, the importance cannot be overlooked and can be a major factor that contributes to retention. Importantly, the career path, pay scale and bonuses are the same for all Surface Warfare Officers regardless of gender.

b. Family

As Kelley, Herzog-Simmer and Harris explained, “although our understanding of military-induced separation is increasing with regard to traditional families in which the father is deployed, noticeably absent from the literature are references to mothers who experience separation from their families.” (Kelley, Herzog-

Simmer and Harris 1994, 126) Kelley, Herzog-Simmer and Harris surveyed 118 U.S. Navy deploying mothers on multiple dimensions, including perceived parenting stress, maternal separation anxiety, parenting attitudes and behavior, and family cohesiveness and organization. The purpose of the study was to provide data on the impact of long-term military-induced separations on mothers. The participants were single and married mothers, all in the enlisted ranks, in both the predeployment and reunion phases of deployment. The report addressed the additional stress imposed on mothers by the predeployment phase, the unique challenges faced by single parents, and the distinctive concerns of deploying mothers. (Kelley, Herzog-Simmer and Harris 1994)

The study suggests that mothers anticipating deployment felt that the parenting role was more stressful and that children were more difficult. This perception may have been caused by concerns about the upcoming separation, which contributed to their reports of higher parenting stress. The reunion group however, did not report increased levels of stress. This perception could be due to the fact that the stresses had already been dealt with in the mothers' absence, and the returning mothers may have been refreshed from a prolonged break in parenting responsibilities. Additionally, mothers anticipating deployment reported more sensitivity to their children, which is likely to influence a child's ability to cope with the changes that deployment imposes on the family. Single parents reported lower levels of family functioning that could be attributed to the potential lack of continuity in caregivers that single parents may have to face during deployment cycles. (Kelley, Herzog-Simmer and Harris 1994, 135)

The overarching conclusions of the study are that women expecting to deploy in the near future should anticipate higher levels of parenting stress, and that single women are expected to have lower levels of family functioning and more concerns about separating from their children. (Kelley, Herzog-Simmer and Harris 1994, 135)

The stress associated with deployment and the parenting role factor into both the Warner and Goldberg ACOL Model as well as Lee and Mitchell's Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover. For a female Surface Warfare Officer with children, the stress associated with parenting during the pre-deployment phase would contribute negatively to the "taste" factors associated with a career in the military. The

stress of the pre-deployment phase could also serve as a “shock” in the Lee and Mitchell Model. If the stress is high enough on the female officer it could serve as the impetus for the officer to consider alternate employment. As outlined in Appendix A, the career path for a Surface Warfare Officer dictates that the majority of the career will be spent at sea. If the stress of the pre-deployment phase is too great on a female officer, the relevant experience of that deployment cycle may elicit the response of leaving the navy so as not to repeat the “shock”.

In their study on “The Effects of Family Structure On Organizational Commitment, Intention To Leave and Voluntary Turnover,” Lee and Maurer present evidence that families constitute a major contextual factor when people leave organizations and clarify their role in both their family and career. (Lee and Maurer 1999, 493) Their study is based on the theory of human capital, and stipulates that because of limitations of one’s time and energy, employees must economize between work and family, and often make choices and sacrifices between the two.

The data used in the study was archival data on U.S. Navy Officers in the Surface Warfare, Aviation Warfare and General Unrestricted Line Communities contained in official military records and personnel records. The sample consisted of 3,129 SWOs, 110 of which were non-white or female. Although gender is not one of the primary variables, the study does offer insight into the basic argument that “family structure increases the systematic social pressures on its members’ allocation decisions of the time and energy devoted to the job or family.” (Lee and Maurer 1999, 507) For the Surface Warfare Officers, the effect of intention to leave on leaving was stronger among married people than single people, and the interaction between intention to leave and an increasing number of children at home was statistically significant with the effect of intention to leave on leaving strengthening as the number of children at home increased. In addition, the negative effect of organizational commitment on intention to leave was weaker among married people than for single people, as was the negative effect of organizational commitment on intention to leave as the number of children at home increased. (Lee and Maurer 1999, 506)

The study concludes that for Surface Warfare Officers, having a spouse and increasing number of children at home created external, contextual conditions that weakened the negative relationship between organizational commitment and intention to leave. With the additional pressures that having a family place on an individual with regards to time allocation, the external contextual factors of having a spouse and increasing number of children decrease the correlation between organizational commitment and intention to leave. Additionally, an increasing number of children strengthened the effect that intention to leave had on an individual's actual leaving. (Lee and Maurer 1999, 507)

c. Leadership

Leadership is one of the major issues contributing to the retention problem in the military. As Hasty and Weber maintain, “contrary to popular belief, problems with retention in the military are a direct result of poor military leadership, not monetary issues.” (Hasty and Weber 2000, 211) In a Surface Warfare Officer Survey conducted in 1999, some of the major negative aspects associated with leadership in the Surface Warfare Community were lack of faith in the Commanding Officer, micromanagement, lack of concern for the junior officers, and careerism on the part of the senior officers.

Between March and June 1998, Rear Admiral Natter, the Deputy for Readiness, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, along with Lieutenants Hodges and Lopez traveled through three theaters, listening to 688 naval officers, lieutenant and below, to garner input into the issues affecting retention of the junior officers. Of the officers whom they spoke with, 88 percent do not aspire to command because it does not look satisfying to them. Junior officers do not see their commanding officers having fun. As they found out, “a staggering number of junior officers we met with felt micromanagement was pervasive in their organizations and in the Navy overall. Most do not feel trusted to make decisions and are frustrated by constant, invasive, ‘in the weeds’ rudder orders from their bosses.” (Natter, Lopez and Hodges, 1998) Many junior officers feel that the tendency to micromanage stems from a zero-defect mentality that

pervades the community. Mistakes, both personal and professional, do not serve as learning tools, but are addressed immediately and punitively.

This zero-defect mentality also contributes to the careerism among military professionals. The desire to achieve the next career milestone drives many officer's thoughts and decisions. Officers are basically required to map out milestones early in their career to maximize their opportunities and remain competitive. As Wooldridge explains, the "focus on ticket-punching over at-sea experience, reduced command opportunity, and the annual budget battles in Washington and the growth in bureaucratic power that they have spawned have made the careerist's values part of the SWO culture." (Wooldridge 1998, 27) The careerist attitude has caused young officers to choose career enhancing billets over potentially fun jobs, and has also contributed to the perception that one cannot overcome mistakes made early in his/her career.

Another attribute of poor leadership that contributes to retention problems is the lack of trust that junior officers have in the senior military officers. In commenting on aviator retention, Commander John R. Hatten and Lieutenant Commander Ronald Horton, specify that inspiring leadership is a central factor in retention. A lack of faith in the senior officers has evolved due to the perception that senior officers are concerned more with the politically correct aspects of decisions, rather than the morally correct solutions. Hatten and Horton propose that improved communication could potentially dispel this perception and restore faith and trust in the senior officers. Communication and understanding up and down the chain of command is necessary to restore the trust in the senior leadership. (Hatten and Horton 1998) As Lieutenant Commander Wallace explains, "junior officers are leaving a profession they love because they perceive that their leaders have failed to listen and act on their concerns. They are resigning in droves because they—and their position as officers—are no longer treated with the same respect as yesteryear." (Wallace 1998, 78)

Although leadership contributes to the retention rates throughout the community and not just for the female officers, it must be addressed because it is one of the strongest factors that affects morale. The command climate can have a significant

affect on whether an individual chooses to stay in the Navy or leave. Leadership contributes a great deal to the “taste factors” associated with the ACOL Model.

D. SUMMARY

To conclude, the understanding of the history of women in the military is vital to understanding the policies and changes that have had specific impact on the inclusion of women in the military. It is also fundamental to understanding the career paths of senior female officers in the community. Regarding retention in the community, the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model presented by Warner and Goldberg and the Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover by Lee and Mitchell present models by which employee turnover can be analyzed, and the decision process that employees go through when considering leaving or remaining in a job.

Numerous factors, whether personal or professional, play into an officer’s career decisions. These factors include many of the ACOL taste factors, as well as the shock and script details of the Unfolding Model Of Voluntary Employee Turnover. Although numerous elements are consistent for both men and women in the community, the retention decisions for officers may take into account many different aspects, including economic factors, family roles, and impact of senior leadership.

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III. METHODOLOGY

Words, especially when they are organized into incidents or stories, have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavor that often proves far more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a policymaker, a practitioner – than pages of numbers. (Miles and Huberman 1984, 15)

A. INTRODUCTION

In-depth interviews with both senior and junior female Surface Warfare Officers are used as the basis for this master's thesis. Through these interviews and the garnering of stories and ideas, themes were developed that led to conclusions of some of the perceptions in the Surface Warfare Community regarding the factors that contribute to retention and attrition. The stories and thoughts from the interviews provide a deeper understanding of the problems, issues and concerns facing the female officers in the community. The stories and ideas contained in the interviews are "a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes" occurring during the officer's time in the Navy. (Miles and Huberman 1984, 15) Through analysis of the interviews, themes were generated to provide comprehensive explanations to the decisions that female Surface Warfare Officers make regarding their decision to stay in the Navy or leave.

This thesis follows the ideas and methods used in a prior study conducted by Traci A. Keegan in her May 1999 Master's Thesis, "Study of Factors Affecting the Retention Decisions of Sea-Going Female Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers." The methods were primarily built upon through the expansion of the study to the Surface Warfare Community as well as the inclusion of senior officers into the study and the modification of the interview questions to incorporate fundamental aspects of the community.

B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

This thesis uses data that were obtained from in-depth interviews conducted with 27 female Surface Warfare Officers. The sample included 12 senior officers and 15

junior officers. All of the officers were Surface Warfare qualified. The distinction between junior officer and senior officer was based upon an officer's position in the Surface Warfare pipeline. Officers who were post-Department Head Officers were considered senior officers. Officers who had not yet completed their second Department Head tour were considered junior officers. Appendix B provides the dates and locations of the interviews, and the rank of the officers interviewed. The officers interviewed were selected on the basis of location and availability. Most of the interviews were initiated based on a master list of female Surface Warfare Officers that was obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS-41). The researcher contacted the interviewees via electronic mail to explain the premise of the thesis. A time and location was then scheduled for the interview.

C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

The researcher conducted the interviews using standardized, open-ended interview questions. After the first interview was conducted, the questions were revised to provide clarity, to improve the quality of the information obtained, and to create a standardized bank of questions. Appendix C provides the interview questions for both the senior officers and junior officers. Any information obtained during the course of the interviews that helped refine the clarity of the questions or supplementary questions to deal with the retention issue were also incorporated into the bank of questions and used in subsequent interviews. Additionally, although the researcher used a standardized bank of questions, the interviews remained "flexible and sensitive to the specific dynamics of each interaction." (Mason 1996, 40) Additional questions were often asked to probe or to respond to an elicited reply from the standardized questions.

With the exception of two of the interviews, all of the interviews were conducted at the interviewees' place of employment. The remaining two interviews were conducted in the researcher's office. The interviews with the junior officers typically lasted from 45 to 60 minutes. The interviews with the senior officers typically lasted 60 to 120 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 180 minutes.

Prior to the start of the interview, the researcher asked the interviewees for permission to audio tape the interview so that the data could be transcribed and incorporated into the final analysis. All of the participants were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. The researcher informed the interviewees that although direct quotes would be extracted from the interviews and used in the justification of established themes, nothing would be attributed directly to any of the officers interviewed.

The researcher began each interview by engaging in casual conversation with interviewees, and explaining the purpose of the thesis. This established a positive initial rapport and the basic premise behind the questions. The researcher then began the interviews with simple background questions to enhance the initial rapport.

The officers that were interviewed were extremely willing to share their thoughts and experiences. Specifically, the junior officers were willing to share their stories and ideas with the researcher, as they were both at similar points in the Surface Warfare pipeline and shared similar backgrounds and experiences. The senior officers were also very willing to share their stories. They also shared a common link, as both were part of the Surface Warfare community. The senior officers seemed particularly proud of their accomplishments and interested in contributing to research that might lead to additional insights into the retention problems in the community.

At the conclusion of the interview, all of the interviewees were asked to complete a basic demographic worksheet. This provides basic background information on the interviewees. Appendix D is the demographic worksheet. Appendix E provides summary information from the demographic worksheets.

D. DATA ANALYSIS

The interviews were recorded on audiocassettes and transcribed verbatim to facilitate data analysis. Once transcribed, the data consisted of over 345 pages of single-spaced text. Notes were taken by the researcher during the course of the interviews to highlight broad trends that were revealed. This contributed to the initial data reduction: “Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and

transforming the ‘raw’ data that appear in written-up field notes.” (Miles and Huberman 1984, 21) Data reductions occurred continuously throughout the course of the study.

After the interviews were transcribed, the researcher compiled the data on templates as a means to display the data. The templates were designed to organize and assemble the notes from the transcription into “an immediately accessible, compact form, so that the analyst can see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move to the next-step analysis the display suggests may be useful.” (Miles and Huberman 1984, 22) Appendix F provides the data template for both the senior officers and junior officers. The templates were analyzed using the constant comparison method of qualitative analysis. (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 112) The constant comparison method is “based on the reduction of theory and the delimitation and saturation of categories.” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 112) This data methodology allowed the researcher to consider a great deal of diversity in the data, and to identify trends and recurring ideas associated with the decisions of female officers regarding retention in the United States Navy. The researcher then generated overarching themes by analyzing recurring issues and thoughts based on the responses from the interviewees.

Chapter IV presents the themes obtained from the data analysis. The themes are supported with specific quotations from the female Surface Warfare Officers interviewed.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents 19 themes generated using Glaser and Strauss' constant comparison method. (Glaser and Strauss 1967) The themes are justified with excerpts from the interviews. The words in brackets are those that were changed from the original interviews with the officers. These changes were made so as to omit any specific data presented by the officers that may compromise anonymity.

The primary intent of this research is to foster an understanding of the major factors that contribute to female Surface Warfare Officers' retention or attrition from the Navy. The 19 themes focus on the reasons why the officers have stayed in or left the Navy, and the officers' thoughts on retention incentives. The 19 themes are grouped into four distinct categories: economic factors, taste factors as associated with the ACOL Model, leadership issues, and family concerns.

Theme I suggests that the economic compensation offered by the Surface Warfare Continuation Pay is not a valuable retention tool. In Themes II through VII, the data presents some of the "taste factors" that are associated with the Division Officer job. The data suggests that the female junior officers are motivated by leadership opportunities, by the ability to impact the sailors that work for them, by the operational aspects of sea tours, and by their dedication to service to their country. The data also suggests that the female officers are disillusioned by the amount of time they spend at work and the lack of intellectual stimulation. Themes VIII through XII suggest that the female officers have not been satisfied with the senior leadership they have observed. The data also suggests that although sexual harassment has not been a serious issue that the junior officers have had to contend with, the integration of females into the Surface Warfare Community could have been a smoother process. The data for Theme XIII suggests that family issues are a compelling factor towards female officers' attrition from the Navy.

In Themes XIV through XVI, the data presents some of the "taste factors" that have been instrumental in the retention of female officers in the Navy. The Themes are supported by excerpts from the interviews with senior officers, and suggest that the

officers have remained in the Navy because of the satisfaction of the opportunity to interact with people, the enjoyment garnered from being out at sea and driving ships, and the opportunities that were presented to them to continue with their careers. Theme XVII and XVIII document two positive aspects of the leadership that the senior officers encountered. The data suggests that the senior officers have received appropriate recognition for achievements in their career and that they had strong role models. Theme XIX conveys female senior officer's thoughts on family issues. Although only three of the 12 senior officers interviewed had children, most of the senior officers do not feel they have sacrificed having a family because of their career choices in the Navy.

B: THEME I: JUNIOR OFFICERS FELT THAT THE SWO BONUS WAS NOT A MOTIVATING FACTOR FOR RETENTION

1. Theme

The researcher asked the junior officers if the SWO bonus has impacted their decision to remain in the Navy. For the three officers wavering on their career decision, all three felt that the SWO bonus was a negative initiative. Of the nine officers planning on resigning, the SWO Bonus did not influence their decision at all. The two officers who are staying in the Navy felt that the bonus was favorable, but only had a marginal impact on their decision to remain in the navy.

2. Justification

Junior Officers 5, 13 and 15 are all wavering in their decision of whether to stay in the Navy or leave. All three felt that the SWO Bonus was a negative initiative. They felt that the senior echelons of the chain of command are not sending out the right message with the implementation of the bonus and that they are not paying attention to the real issues that are driving junior officers out of the Navy:

It is a crock. I think after taxes and everything, I heard you get like \$35,000. I think that you can make that in a bonus in a job on the outside. It all depends if you are having fun and they are putting you in the places that you want to be. That is what it comes down to. And what place I am at in my life.

By the same token, a \$50K bonus to stay SWO for two Department Head tours which we are looking at 4-5 years at sea isn't enough either, and that is just bull. I mean, \$50K compared to what everybody else gets is just nothing, and I am insulted by it. I would rather they just didn't give us anything because that is just...by the time that you do the math, there are no benefits there really. By and large, I think that the people that are accepting the bonus were already going to stay in the Navy for life. I've seen what happens when they become senior officers...so you've got a few really, really good ones and a lot of I'm-not-sure-what-I-want-to-do. So people who are committed and people who aren't are staying because of the money. The people who are committed were going to stay in anyway, so I don't think that it makes a difference.

Somewhat long overdue, but I don't really see it as a fix to all the problems. I know why they did it, I know that it is working, but I think that the best officers in any service aren't doing it for the money. I think that you are sending the wrong message by attracting the people with a monetary goal. By paying someone \$50,000 are they going to be a better leader? Are they going to be more committed to their people? Are they going to be out there giving extra effort? Are they going to be dedicated, honorable? Are they going to be the people that you want to go into battle with you? Do you want someone that you paid, or someone that wanted to be there? So, I'm torn. I know why they did it. I know why they needed to do it. But I don't think that it fixes the problems. The problems are widespread, and there is no one single band-aid that is going to fix it...the long hours, the constant underway time, the arduous training cycles, the maintenance, the constant maintenance, all those things. So, \$50,000 to fix that?

Junior Officers 9 and 11 were disappointed in the initiative and felt that the Navy was not looking at the deeper issues and causes that might be driving people out.

Then that \$50,000 band-aid that they tried to slap on it just embarrassed me for the whole community. Absolutely. That's when I made my decision. Because I had sort of been vacillating and when they said \$50,000, I was done with the Surface Navy. They were saying, "We're not going to fix any of the problems." I had every Admiral within a thousand miles of Fifth Fleet when I was in the Gulf who came on our [ship]. They wanted to know what the JOs were thinking. I was like, "Great. This is great. They are really trying to fix this problem." So they talk about quality of life and people bring up really easy issues, like why aren't we trained better, why is SWOS six months and it is sort of a joke,

why don't we go out on ships before we step aboard our first ships and we are already conning officer qualified because we have a college education? Their solution to the fact that there are real problems that exist and there are people getting out because of these real problems is, well, we'll bribe you. We'll pay you \$50,000 if you stay in. So who is going to stay in? Not the good people. The people who are like, "I couldn't make that much money on the outside, why not get a \$50,000 bonus?" It ensured that mediocrity was going to be rewarded, to me. That's just what it said. And they weren't going to deal with the more fundamental issues.

I also think that it is insulting...I don't think that the Navy gets it yet. But I think that it is insulting, and I put it in my resignation letter, that they are trying to offer \$50 grand to stay in. If they think that's what it takes to keep good people in the Navy, then the Navy doesn't get it. These PALM Pilots, Laptops initiative... it just really ticks me off. Because they don't understand what they need at this point and if they think that they are going to buy hired help that is just wrong. And the \$50,000, it is keeping some people in that are on the fence, maybe they have one or two kids. Fifty thousand does look nice if you need to put a down payment on a house or pay off some bills, it is great. And I'm not saying that it is a bad thing in that respect, but why don't they try to fix the root cause of what's going on out there in the Navy.

Junior Officers 2 and 14 think the bonus is a good gesture, but for them, their commitment is not about the money:

I thought that was a nice thing for them to do and it certainly was encouraging, but for me what works out to be about \$6400 a year is not enough. \$40,000 over five years... I'd say it is not a reason to stay in, but if you do stay in and you don't sign up for it you are an idiot. The SWO Bonus did nothing for me because I am not in it for the pay. I am in a position right now where the pay that I make suits my purposes just fine.

They gave the SWO Bonus. That is a lot of money, but I don't think any of us are in this business for money. I know that I'm not. That wasn't even a factor for me. Yeah, it is a nice chunk of change and I could get that boat that I wanted, but you know, it is not enough to get me to stay.

Junior Officer 3 thinks that the incentive was positive, but it did not serve as a factor for her in making a career decision:

If I was going to stay in that would be great. I wouldn't tell them to keep their \$50,000 that's for sure. But when you're making decisions about being a family or not being a family, you can certainly survive without the \$50,000. I think that it was a great thing to offer as far as saying, "Hey we need SWOs. They're important and we need them to stay in." I think this is a really good move for the Navy, but that really didn't influence me at all.

Junior Officer 4 feels the monetary compensation offered by the bonus does not counteract the negative experiences that the officers have had which cause them to leave the Navy:

I don't think that it sways too many people one way or another. That's just my opinion. Most of us have had such bad experiences that no amount of money will buy us back. It doesn't matter. It's a nice perk for people who stay in. It is a nice perk for people who had already planned on a career. And if anyone makes their decision based on \$50,000, I don't know if I want to be working for them anyway. So, I do think it is a nice reward. I wish there were more rewards and prestige associated with the community

Junior Officer 8 feels that the bonus is a good reward, but thinks that the additional five-year commitment is a deterrent:

It hasn't and the reason why is that five years of commitment is at this point for me too much. If it were a year by year option, or maybe it were just a couple of years I would think about it, but five years is...we have no idea what the military is even going to look like five years from now. So to be tied into it for that long is too long. I think that people that were going to stay in for that long anyway, didn't need to be convinced. It is nice for them, and that's great. But people who were thinking about getting out are not willing to spend, commit to five years. Maybe a year or two of additional commitment that if they were on the fence anyway, that five- year commitment doesn't look good to them. I don't think that it has really helped that much.

3. Analysis

For the 13 female junior officers who are planning on leaving the Navy or wavering in their decision, the SWOCP was viewed as a negative incentive. This data

does not correlate with the data from the most recent Surface Warfare Junior Officer Survey (LaFleur, Foley and Balisle 2002), where 82 percent of the junior officers who completed the survey felt that the establishment of the SWOCP was a positive step for the community. The data garnered from the interviews is more closely supported by the fact that only six percent of the junior officers felt that adequate compensation was a top factor affecting morale. (LaFleur, Foley and Balisle 2002) Some female junior officers believe that although bonuses often show that the Navy cares about retention, “most JOs consider benefits and compensation much less important than other retention drivers.” (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 61)

Although one major point of the ACOL model is the Navy can compensate individuals through bonuses and pay, the importance of the non-pecuniary factors cannot be overlooked. For the female junior officers interviewed, the impact of the bonus was negative because, although they felt the bonus showed the Navy did care about the reasons for leaving the Navy, they felt that the attention was misdirected. The policy makers, by implementing the SWOCP, are not focusing on the real issues that are driving the junior officers out of the community and the Navy, but are just focusing on the economic issues, which, as we shall see, are not the reasons that most junior officers choose to remain in the Navy.

C. THEME II: THE MOST POSITIVE ASPECT OF SEA TOURS FOR MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LEADERSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO IMPACT OTHER’S LIVES

1. Theme

The junior officers were asked to describe some of the positive aspects of their sea tours. The majority, 9 of the 15, was positively influenced by the leadership opportunities that they were afforded as Surface Warfare Officers. They took a great deal of pride in being in a position to impact other’s lives, particularly their junior sailors.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 2 enjoyed her role as a counselor to her division:

That was one of the things that I enjoyed most about the job was being a manager, not only of the maintenance schedule and the daily work list, but helping them get their lives to where they wanted it to be professionally, and even personally.

Junior Officer 8 was satisfied with the high degree of responsibility that was conferred upon her and her ability to help others:

The high degree of responsibility that is given to junior officers right away is a positive thing. At the time, sometimes it drives you right up a tree, but really I think for smart and capable people, I think to be able to get in there and feel like you are doing some good is a really nice thing. And I'd also say there were a lot of little moments of connecting with people in some fashion or another. Either, you know, helping somebody solve something in their personal life or helping them achieve something that they wouldn't have gotten if I hadn't been around, and those are just moments that I will carry around with me and look back on as peak moments. It is certainly exciting.

Junior Officer 9 was amazed by the role and abilities of the people who serve in ships, and was proud to have the opportunity to be a part of it:

An amazing group of people. The work we do on ships is so underrated. The Navy underrates it even. It is underrated by just the general public in terms of the stamina, talent, all that's required to get a ship underway and keep it underway, and then add to that all the operations between a carrier, all the flight ops. It is amazing to me. Just everyday I was amazed to see the division of labor. So, people had very specific things to do, but it all came together somehow, and I like being a part of that. And they trusted me to do that which is, I think...it happens rarely. Giving you that trust and standing back and letting you learn. It is really an effective way to lead. It is not just a good way to lead, but it makes the subordinate feel a part of the whole which is something that the Navy does really badly, I think. Especially in SWO.

Junior Officer 10 found her role as a division officer to be one of the highlights of her career thus far, and was specifically satisfied by the impact that she had on her sailors:

Definitely being a divo on the ship. I really saw how my decisions affected other people. On a daily basis, I saw people encouraged or discouraged by things that I had control over, which was really great. Even little things that I could do for them. They really took it to heart. I think I really learned what leadership was for them. And it really had a huge impact. It was very rewarding to me every time that somebody would ask me to reenlist them or even invite me to their reenlistment ceremony. It was really rewarding to me, towards the end of my time there, to see that all the young guys, the third class and the seamen who swore they were getting out at the end of their commitment, decided to stay. That was the most rewarding part to me, to see how much of an influence I could have on people. Give them hope and make them feel like they were really part of the team. That the ship was really a team and they really had an important part to play.

Junior Officer 11 was often required to stand up for her people and defend them or protect them, and saw this as part of her leadership role as a division officer:

I have really learned a lot about taking care of and protecting my people. I've become, not maternal, but very much a steward of my people. I've developed a strong sense of ownership that I never had before, as far as taking care of people and protecting them.

Junior Officer 14 felt that her second tour was more successful than her first because she was given a great deal of responsibility and latitude in implementing ideas:

My second tour I was actually expected to come up with ideas and try them out, and if they failed, find out why they did, what could make it better. Or if it worked, hey good, why is it working, keep it up kind of thing. I felt like I was treated like an adult, like a responsible adult. People listened to what I had to say when I gave them opinions and I really appreciated that. From driving the ship as the OOD, to overall basic damage control training for the entire ship. If I said something, somebody listened. I appreciated that which was a complete 180 from my first tour.

Junior Officer 15 was proud of her contribution to bringing the ship into an operational realm and seeing the impact of her leadership:

I think that the positive thing that I got out of that was real time, practical leadership opportunities. Seeing how people interact, what motivates them, what doesn't, morale. My very first command was by far the worst with almost tyranny onboard and morale in the gutter. But by the time that I left that ship, it was one of the best ships on the waterfront. I mean, I took it from a hunk of metal, to a living, breathing ship that had the opportunity to shoot missiles for real. Kind of a rags-to-riches type philosophy on there. I think that was really rewarding, to see that happening and to be a part of that. To be an integral part of that. And I believe that I was. That was really dynamic. I really enjoyed that. I think the most rewarding thing is the practical leadership and being part of something bigger, and actually seeing something good happen. I think a lot of times you are part of something, but it is something that is really bad or negative and that can leave a bad taste in your mouth. Favorable, rewarding experiences where the team went forward – that was positive.

D: THEME III: THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF MOTIVATION FOR THE JUNIOR OFFICERS IS THEIR ROLE AS A DIVISION OFFICER AND THE IMPACT THEY HAVE ON THEIR PEOPLE

1. Theme

When the researcher asked the officers what motivated them to serve in the Navy, the majority of the officers, 11 of the 15, said that they were motivated by their role as officers and were dedicated to the sailors who worked for them. The junior officers were proud of the impact that they felt they had in their role as a division officer.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 2 was motivated by her role as a mentor and leader to the enlisted sailors:

I really enjoyed working with other people. I liked being a mentor and a leader to junior sailors and helping them stay motivated and stay positive and set goals and everything. So the whole idea of being a leader, even though it was just a division of 20 or 30 folks, for me was very rewarding.

Junior Officer 5 was motivated by her role as a counselor to her enlisted sailors:

But I would have to say that I am proud to follow in my father's footsteps. I'm doing things that my friends would never, ever do. I had 40 Bo' swain's Mates and half of them younger than me with incredible problems that they shouldn't have, and me counseling them on it. Working with younger people, and being around the enlisted motivates me.

Junior Officer 9 is committed to doing her best because people's lives depend on her duties and expertise:

When I graduated and got to my first ship and when I saw what I was in charge of, the reality of it became very quickly clear to me and so the commitment really was that I have to do everything I can to do my job well because people's lives really are on the line. That is not just a saying that people die because you don't train right or people die because you cut corners and didn't keep your equipment up to date and maintenance properly, etc. So, I mean it became a very real commitment to me in terms of making myself the best possible Commo or DCA or whatever.

Junior Officer 10 is motivated by her responsibility to serve as the example to her people and society as a whole:

I think when I first came in the Navy I didn't really understand the scope, the magnitude of the decision that I made. It is very, very important to me that I set an example now, not only to my shipmates but to other Americans. I want them to look at me and know that this is the kind of person that is taking care of the Navy and the country for them.

Junior Officer 11 is motivated by the people who depend on her:

The people who depend on me. The people who work for me and my peers. I used to be motivated by the greater good, which would be the Navy itself, the SWO Community, my leaders, CO, XO, Department Head types. That changed on my first ship. It changed drastically, just because of the way we were treated and everything.

Junior Officer 13 feels extremely dedicated to her young enlisted sailors and her role in taking care of them:

But they also knew that I was there for them and I would continue to be there for them. That's a lot of responsibility and they needed somebody to look out for them. Nobody else was willing to do it. Who's going to look out for them when my 20-year old FN came and told the other guys that his girlfriend was pregnant? She's 19. What's he going to do? Of course they made sure that I found out because he wouldn't tell me. It is just taking care of them. You have to do it. Somebody has to do it, because they don't have any other options. Some people were not as fortunate as we were growing up.

Junior Officer 15 is dedicated to her job so as to be competent and be a leader for her sailors:

It is conferred upon me the privilege of being a leader at the age of 22 to all these people. I think that is pretty cool. And I don't like to fail, to be perfectly blunt. So, I am dedicated to making that happen. I also think that people are important to the whole organization. You can't do anything in the Navy without the people that go behind it, and that's something that a lot of organizations can't say. So, working with people is something that I really enjoy, and seeing them succeed and being part of the community and all that kind of stuff is pretty motivating.

3. Analysis

On the recent 2001 Surface Warfare Junior Officer Survey, 66 percent of the officers that responded cited the opportunity to lead others as their primary reason for becoming a Surface Warfare Officer. Additionally, the top satisfier for the officers, as supported by 86 percent of the officers that responded, was their relationships with subordinates. As Kacher states, "Let them [officers] lead and they will be hooked. Give our division officers the opportunity to lead and they will thrive; rob them of that opportunity and they will languish" (Kacher 1999, 51). As supported by many of the female junior officers interviewed, the leadership opportunities as a division officer and the satisfaction garnered from the ability to support and help their subordinates are, thus far, the most important highlights of their career.

The leadership opportunities are one of the non-pecuniary factors associated with the ACOL model. As leadership is one of the primary initial influences of junior officers choosing the Surface Warfare Community, if junior officers are not given the opportunity

to lead, one of the most satisfying elements of their career will be lost. Junior officers need to be given as many opportunities as possible to lead and to interact with their sailors so as to create a greater appreciation for a critical aspect of military “taste factors” that they may not be able to obtain in a civilian career.

E: THEME IV: QUALIFICATIONS AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF SEA TOURS SERVE AS THE PEAK EXPERIENCES FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS

1. Theme

The researcher asked the officers to discuss one or two experiences they had on their ship that they would deem, thus far, the peak experience of their career. Achieving a specific qualification was a peak experience for 9 of the 15 officers. The trust imbued to the officers through the achievement of the qualifications serves as a very positive reward and the culmination of many hours of studying, training and watchstanding. For the majority of the officers interviewed, qualifications, typically as Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) or Officer of the Deck (OOD) served as a defining moment in their career. Additionally, officers also found a great deal of satisfaction in actually performing the expected mission of the platforms on which they were serving, to include deployment and operational exercises.

2. Justification

For Junior Officer 1, firing an exercise torpedo and deployment were peak events:

The coolest moment was when I was ASWO and I got to shoot a torpedo during an exercise. That all came together with a helicopter, the torpedo, getting the target, and me giving the weapons release, obviously it was an exercise, but that was my most memorable day. And then deployment. I really enjoyed deployment. Being out there, doing our job, feeling like we were making a difference in the world.

Junior Officer 2 cited two peak experiences, the first concerning deployment and the second was her qualification as EOOW:

The first one would be my deployment on [the ship], where I...which sort of summarizes my whole [command] experience. It was having independent responsibility and taking the team, working it all up on my own, deploying all by myself, being the only woman on the ship, which presented a few unique challenges, and having a successful deployment over there which kind of enable me to say, "Hey look, you guys stuck me on the ship and you didn't think that I was going to do so great, and I walked away and we had the best deployment any detachment has ever had." My second probably most proud moment, or something that I can look back on with a lot of happiness is when I qualified EOOW on [the ship]. I really thought that was completely great. Just really, truly understanding how the engineering plant all interacted with one another and I would have been content to stay in engineering and standing watch as EOOW.

Junior Officer 3 was particularly proud of her division's performance during numerous evolutions on deployment and also her qualification as EOOW:

There was a week in the Persian Gulf on my first deployment on [the ship] where we had to do a tow-and-be-towed exercise, three unregs, and they were three-station unregs which was a real challenge because our division was undermanned even on deployment. We had a whole bunch of small boat exercises and at the end of the week we were going to anchor. So just a whole bunch of Deck exercises and it was insanity. I just felt that I was drowning in work, but it was so rewarding. It was a really busy week but very rewarding to get everything done successfully. Nobody got hurt. The ship looked good because we did everything well. And then actually standing EOOW. It was one thing to work on the qual and to get the qual. But actually standing EOOW watch, to be trusted to stand EOOW watch. The Chief Engineer didn't feel that he had to be in Central all the time when I was there. I was allowed to stand during Flight Ops, occasionally during General Quarters which wasn't that big of a deal. During Engineering Casualty Control Drills when a casualty happened the Chief Engineer trusted me to handle it. I felt like he trusted me. Not a real specific moment, but I took a lot of pride in that.

Junior Officer 4 was motivated by the operational commitments of her jobs, but was specifically proud of the qualifications that she achieved:

Probably when I got my quals. I got an EOOW Qual on my first ship and I never thought I would understand engineering, much less be qualified and competent at it, so that was pretty cool. And I got my TAO letter on the carrier so that was a pretty big deal.

Junior Officer 5 was amazed by the places she saw and the exercises in which she participated on deployment, but was specifically proud of achieving her Surface Warfare qualification and having her father pin her:

When I finally had gotten my Surface Officer qualification and I was about to be pinned, my Surface Warfare Pin, my father pinned it on me. He flew out to San Diego with my mom and we had a little thing up on the Signal Bridge and he pinned his Surface Warfare pin on me. That was neat. That was a peak.

Junior Officer 7 served aboard a ship that was involved in firing tomahawks:

The other thing that was a peak experience was that I was on a ship that fired Tomahawks. I don't know how that is going to be put on there, but the experience of doing national tasking, of actually doing something real and knowing that you've made a huge accomplishment and contribution to the Navy and to the world or the country. That immediate satisfaction was great. I'm glad that I got to see that while I was in the Navy.

Junior Officer 8 was especially proud of earning her qualification as an Officer of the Deck on an Aircraft Carrier:

I would say standing Officer of the Deck on a carrier, once I did get qualified, was definitely a peak experience because once I got kind of settled into it and, I wouldn't really call it comfortable; if you ever feel comfortable in that position then you're not getting all the facts, because there is always something that is stressing you in some fashion. But, just the feeling of accomplishment that comes from that and the feeling of, you know, here I have done something that very few people have ever been able to do and that's a really great thing. I don't think that's a feeling that ever goes away.

Junior Officer 11 deemed her qualification as a Boarding Officer one of her peak experiences. Although there was hesitancy on the part of her command in allowing a

woman to qualify, she was permitted to attempt the qualification and led a very successful boarding team:

Also on that ship during the deployment, we were in the Arabian Gulf and I had to fight because they didn't want to have any women on the Boarding Team. We did that in the Gulf. And the Coast Guard's been having women do it for years. But they didn't want women doing it. And I really had to fight. I became a Boarding Officer. I became a member of my team and we actually had the best team, as far as success and efficiency and everything else, and running the operations. And I am not saying that it is all attributed to me, but I was part of a team that was considered the best. And that was very important to me. But I had to fight to do that. I actually had to go to bat to the CO and the XO, and I said, "Look at my Marksman Quals. I'm a better shooter than half the people that you are looking at and all the other things. I'm qualified and I don't know that these people are going to mess with me." I really had to make a case for myself. I had to sell myself, but I did it and it was worth it. They realized then that there was no reason for them to have those fears of putting a woman on the scene. So that was a highlight that I did get on the team and it was successful in the long run.

Junior Officer 13 was especially proud of her OOD Qualification and Surface Warfare Pin, especially obtaining both as an ensign:

The day that I got my OOD letter. The day that I got my pin. Those were just incredibly exciting days. Walking around the ship as a baby ensign with a SWO pin on was a neat experience.

F: THEME V: JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE COMMITTED TO THE NAVY BECAUSE OF THEIR DEDICATION TO SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY

1. Theme

The researcher asked the officers what their commitment to the Navy means to them. The majority of the officers, 11 of the 15, responded that it is based on their dedication to service to the country. Most view their position in the Navy as a very honorable profession

2. Justification

Junior Officer 1 stated that although service to her country was not what proved the initial impetus to join the Navy, her dedication has become stronger over the course of her career:

Well, higher than the Navy, I mean there's a change. When I first came into the Navy, I was coming in to get a job. [After] graduating from college [I wondered] what I was going to do next. I needed to get income. I needed to be working. But now it definitely is service. Serve my country and that comes more from my family who is very patriotic and I have a much better appreciation for that now, I think. Service to my country is the biggest thing.

Junior Officer 2 was motivated to join the Navy based on her, and her family's, dedication to government service:

For me personally, it has a lot to do with the commitment to government service. In a sense I feel that I am an intelligent, educated person. I'm concerned with government and the way our country runs and the ideals of our constitution, and it is important for me, in one way or another, to serve the constitution. It is a tremendous sort of pride for me, personally, to say that I am a member of the armed forces. The community that I come from and in my family I am held in pretty high esteem because I did that. So that's kind of neat for me.

Junior Officers 3 and 11 continue to be motivated by service to the country, but have found that the sentiment has taken on a more personal level in their dedication to the Navy and the people that they are responsible for:

I think initially it was more just a kind of general patriotism kind of thing. A real patriotic feeling. And not that that went away, but having a division and knowing that you as a division officer are really there for your division is motivating. The expertise really comes from within your division. You become an expert as a manager, but you are there to lead them so that they can do their job. There was a shift from me having pride in my country and this patriotic feeling to serving my division.

You focus inward and you focus on where you can do the most good. So my commitment changed on that first ship after becoming an officer from looking upward and looking for that upward approval as being concerned with the greater good which would be the command and the Navy, and

just focusing downward on making sure my people are taken care of, my peers, my other JOs, making sure the division is taken care of, the Department at the level that I can.

Junior Officers 5 and 10 are proud to serve and feel it is their duty to do the best they can with the jobs that they are required to do, as it plays a role in the overall mission of the Navy:

I give a lot to the Navy, but in turn, the Navy gives a lot to the country, and, as cheesy as this sounds, to the world, safeguarding it. So I don't think my little, tiny contribution, as taxing as it is on my body, is that bad. So I am proud to serve.

My commitment to the Navy is not just to the Navy, but to the country and I feel that it is my responsibility to do the best job with any project that I have or have been given.

Junior Officer 14 is very passionate about her role and contributions to the Navy, not only for repaying the benefits that she has received, but also to do her part in serving the country:

As hokey as it sounds, I wanted to serve my country and that was my primary reason for doing it. I wanted to repay a good childhood, and the opportunities to see the world, that kind of stuff. But mostly to serve my country. I am very proud to put on my uniform every single day. I think more Americans should do it. It is a very unique experience and I can hold my head high everyday; no matter if I made a right decision or a wrong decision, I was trying my best. I would tell anybody to join the military, and I would tell anybody to go SWO. Despite my experiences, I think that it is a good time.

3. Analysis

To analyze Themes IV and V, as Warner and Goldberg related in their ACOL Model, "in the U.S. Navy sea duty is the major non-pecuniary element influencing reenlistment decisions of enlisted personnel." (Warner and Goldberg 1984, 26) The Model further specifies that the higher the incidence of sea duty, the lower the reenlistment rate is regardless of the level of pay and bonuses. (Warner and Goldberg 1984, 26) Although the incidence of sea duty lowers the reenlistment rates, there are

numerous positive elements associated with the incidence of sea duty, two of which are achievement of qualifications and the achievement of operational missions.

The achievement of certain qualifications, particularly that of Officer of the Deck, Surface Warfare Officer and Engineering Officer of the Watch, are essential in the career of a Surface Warfare Officer. Failure to achieve certain qualifications may result in an officer not being qualified for certain billets or not being promoted, and can eventually result in an officer being separated from the Naval Service. As such, the achievement of these qualifications is necessary if an officer desires to remain in the Navy and in the Surface Warfare Community. If an officer does not qualify or promote in the Surface Warfare Community, they will be forced to separate from the Navy and will not have to make the decision to stay in or leave the Navy. As noted in the 2001 Junior Officer Survey Results, qualifications achievement is the number two response as to what junior officers are most proud of in their service as a SWO, with a 21 percent response rate. The process of achieving the Surface Warfare Pin requires the officer to be qualified in Basic and Advance Damage Control, Basic Engineering, and Officer of the Deck. The officer then goes before a board of senior officers on the ship to prove his/her knowledge on all aspects of the ship, as well as other warfare communities. After passing the board, the officer is then awarded the Surface Warfare Pin, which affords the officer the designation of Surface Warfare Officer. The process typically takes six to 18 months. It is a highlight of the Surface Warfare career not only because of the work that goes into achieving the qualification, but also because of the trust and responsibility that is conferred upon the officer with the achievement of the qualifications.

G: THEME VI: THE PRIMARY STRESS FOR THE JUNIOR OFFICERS INVOLVES TIME

1. Theme

The majority of the junior officers, 10 of the 15, felt that time was their most precious resource and were particularly stressed with trying to allocate time between their various commitments with the excessive amount of time they spent at work.

Additionally, although the officers typically found deployment to be very rewarding for numerous reasons, the time away from home posed a stress to the officers.

2. Justification

Junior Officers 1 and 8 found the length of the workday to be excessive:

It is hard work. You get tired and stressed, but I knew that that comes with the game. There were times on my ship where we worked and worked and worked, and then the ship's schedule would change and we were not getting time off. There were times when the ship and the requirements expected us to go for weeks, you know over a month, non-stop and those were hard times. You know, who's looking out for me and my sanity?

I would say in the middle of that shipyard period when it was the third month in a row where I was working an average of maybe 95 or 100 hours a week, and just things go wrong in your personal life, like they always do. Or somebody in your family has a problem, or whatever and you just can't spend any time on it because you are at work all the time. I would say moments produced by that combination of events were definitely probably a low point.

Junior Officer 6, 7 and 10 found the time away to be the most significant source of stress, particularly since their husbands are also in the military:

Easily the time away from home. This is definitely influenced by the fact that my husband is also deployed. We have spent an incredible amount of time apart. I did three deployments overseas. He did two full deployments, one Carrier Operations and two Baltic Operations. So we were just constantly missing each other. As of September 2000, when I left sea duty, we had been married for two years and four months. He had figured up to that point, out of two years and four months, we had yet to spend 180 days together. We went opposite Battle Groups for both of our sea tours. Basically the Navy's position was, "Well, at least we got you in the same town. Just be happy for that."

Well, for me personally I am dual military and it is just the back-to-back deployments. That has been really hard.

Well, the major stressor has probably been the impact on my dedication to my ship versus my family. I'm married. My husband is a pilot and we have a four-year old daughter. It was very difficult, especially when I first got to the ship and first started workups to deal with those responsibilities.

Junior Officers 2 and 3 found the time away to be stressful as well because of the separation from their significant other or family:

As I developed that close relationship with the person, leaving and deploying and getting underway, it was extremely stressful to me just because, I really enjoyed the Navy, but at that point would have much preferred to just be staying home with my boyfriend, planning our wedding and stuff.

One of the lowest points was the day that I left on my second full deployment on [the ship] because I was leaving not just my husband but my 18-month old son. I wanted to go on deployment. In fact I extended for the last two months so I could finish out the deployment. I wanted to do that. That's what we've been training for of course. But, that was really, really hard and I don't look forward to ever doing that again. But I guess sometimes the time sump that the Navy is...and it really is. You just have to devote so much time to it. I kind of feel, not so much short-changed because I choose to have a family, but I don't feel like you can balance it all the time. I don't feel like if you're doing your job in the Navy and you're really doing the best that you can do at your job, I don't feel like you can do that and at the same time do a really good job with my family. I don't feel like there is enough to make that all happen. You're either devoting enough time to the Navy or devoting enough time to your family, and there aren't enough hours in the day to do both.

3. Analysis

As Lee and Mitchell propose in their Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover, as an employee encounters "shocks" in their employment, they consider alternate occupations. In two of the decision paths, shocks cause the employee to either reassess the desire to remain in the organization or to leave the organization. According to the 2001 Junior Officer Survey Results, the top two dissatisfiers for junior officers are the inability to plan and schedule family and/or personal activities, with a response rate of 60 percent, and the work hours required, with a response rate of 52 percent.

Although junior officers are aware that they will be required to work hard and work long hours, they are often not prepared for the reality of how many hours they must spend at work. Although officers are usually prepared for the six months they will spend at sea during the deployment phase, often times the junior officers are not prepared for the amount of time that they spend at work and on the ship during inport periods. Although numerous efforts have been made to curtail the amount of time that a ship spends out at sea during the interdeployment training cycle, numerous hours are still spent preparing for assist visits and inspections. As Natter, Lopez and Hodges note, “We have created a program that never gives the ship or the crew a rest, and the burden is falling heavily on the JOs.” (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 62) The “shock” of the time spent out at sea, or away from homeport, is an important factor that the female officers interviewed consider when deciding to stay in the Navy or leave. Utilizing the excessive hours spent at work as the “shock” in Decision Path 2 of the Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover, the female junior officers have reassessed their commitment to the Navy because the amount of time spent at work has conflicted with their values or goals. Due to the vast amount of hours spent at work, many of the female junior officers feel that they cannot pursue their other goals, such as time spent with family, and decide that they cannot stay in the Navy.

Of the top ten satisfiers listed on the 2001 Junior Officer Retention Survey, the sense that the work that the officer is doing is valuable was the number eight satisfier with 57 percent response rate. Officers do feel pride in achieving the mission and dedicating their time and talents to service to the country, but as Natter, Lopez and Hodges note, “although today’s program of peacetime engagement and contingency operations is important, instability is an amorphous enemy and its defeat a delayed gratification at best.” (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 62) They continue to assert that although the mission is important, it becomes increasingly difficult for officers and sailors to justify missing important events, such as the birth of their children or anniversaries, when a great deal of time away is spent on tactical exercises and acting as the world’s police on patrol, and not achieving a concrete mission or fighting a clear enemy. (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 62) This contributes directly to the monetary value assigned to the military “taste factors” associated with the ACOL Model.

H: THEME VII: FOR THE OFFICERS LEAVING THE NAVY, MOST HOPE TO PURSUE ADDITIONAL EDUCATION

1. Theme

Of the 13 officers who are getting out or undecided on their career decision, 8 want to pursue additional education because they do not feel they have been intellectually challenged during their time in the Navy.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 4 hopes to pursue more education and then continue with service-oriented work:

Going on to more school. Get my doctorate. I want to eventually, I haven't decided yet, somehow end up in social services or the Peace Corps, something along those general lines where I am actually feeling like I'm doing something for people instead of floating around on a boat for six months. That was the biggest thing that I did like about the Amphibious Ship was that we did Operations Other than War. Not a lot of it, but we really shouldn't do a lot of it, but I did like it. I've always enjoyed when we could help another ship out there that needed medical attention or was on fire and we'd go over and try and put out the fire. Anything like that. I always liked helping people.

Junior Officer 7 is excited to go back to school and be involved in studies that are interesting to her:

I just want to work with subject matter that I find intellectually challenging. I don't enjoy dealing with things like deployments and weapons, and it is sad to say because I know that I joined the Navy and that is what it is all about, but I just found through the years, even with an open mind, those things just don't interest me.

Junior Officer 8 is looking forward to pursuing an education that interests her, and thinks that it is more feasible outside of the Navy:

Being on land all the time, if I weren't dedicatedly doing my further education I would have more opportunity for higher education, where I know if I am in the Navy I am going to be underway a lot, which means I can't do it. The Navy is making steps forward. They have Distance Learning and Video Learning and stuff like that, but it is all business

oriented or for degrees that I am not interested in. So, having a job on land would allow me to pursue that education.

Junior Officer 9 will welcome the intellectual challenge:

I'm going to get my PhD and teach, so that's another impact. I kind of came here to see if I was going to like teaching but I kind of had an inkling that I did and that this is what I would do. I want that intellectual side that's challenged. It is the intellectual challenge plus everything else. Plus you get to deal with people who you can help shape their lives and do good things for them. I'm looking at a small university or even a college prep and coaching, and all those kind of things where you really help someone at the beginning of their life and sort of are part of why they become a good person, and a good citizen. So it is really what you do in the Navy on the other side, which I think is equally admirable.

Junior Officer 13 is disappointed in the lack of intellectual challenge that she has encountered in the navy:

I look forward to intellectual stimulation of which I have had absolutely none for the last five years. And that has been a huge, huge downer.

Junior Officer 15 is currently pursuing her graduate degree, and is very excited about being involved in a curriculum that is interesting to her:

I feel like I've found a niche and I really...Probably the right place for me to go is into [subject] which really fires me, which is unbelievable, into academics again. I want to go back and sign some books out again and just take them home and read them completely because I didn't get to do them justice, which is not like me. It is exciting and I have never had that feeling where I want to open a textbook. But I like it. It makes me think in my mind a lot. I don't know specifically where I want to go with that. I am really enjoying the academic ride on that.

3. Analysis

As Lee and Mitchell propose in Decision Path 4 of their Unfolding Model of Employee Turnover, an employee may choose to leave an organization because, over time, he/she believes that there are discrepancies between his/her values and goals and that of the job that he/she has. Of the 13 officers that plan on leaving the Navy, eight did not receive the intellectual stimulation that they desired. During their time on shore duty,

they have taken the opportunity to pursue educational opportunities, and have found the intellectual stimulation and satisfaction that they desire. Since their desire for intellectual stimulation was not met in the Navy, these officers will leave the Navy and seek other avenues where they feel there will be a increased likelihood of pursuing the educational and employment opportunities that they find stimulating and rewarding.

I. THEME VIII: THE MOST NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE JUNIOR OFFICERS IS DUE TO LEADERSHIP SHORTCOMINGS OBSERVED IN THE SUPERIORS FOR WHOM THEY WORKED

1. Theme

During the interviews, the researcher asked the officers about elements of their sea tours that had influenced them in a negative way. Most of the officers, 10 of the 15, cited poor senior leadership that they encountered on their ships as the most negative influence on their careers thus far.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 2 encountered a Department Head who was a good engineer, but a horrible leader:

I think that the experiences with my [Chief Engineer] on my first ship, were probably overall the worst experiences that I have had in the Navy as far as any type of influence at any time. I had no benefits gained by working for him. He was a horrible role model, just in everything from personal manners, to personal appearance, to the way he treated people, yelling and screaming in front of my junior sailors. He was very demanding and he was an intelligent engineer, but was a horrible leader. Just a horrible, miserable person to work for. He made very rash decisions and didn't...never cared about any...in fact all of the junior officers that worked for him are getting out of the Navy. All seven of them. You know, I kept saying that if there is even the slightest chance that I may have to work for somebody like him again, I do not want to work in this job or on a ship again. That was pretty miserable. And that really has been the only truly negative thing that stands out in my mind. Everything else might have been a challenge, but there were good and bad things associated with that challenge. That was purely negative, and that was 18 months of my two-year tour on that ship.

Junior Officer 4 was most strongly impacted by a department head who was a screamer:

My boss just yelled at me time and time again, day after day, over and over. He saw my watch time as my personal time. So the eight hours a day of watch was my time and the rest of that time was his time, so I never slept for months and months. You can only go for so long after that. He was just...daily abuse. It was just a running...we kept a little log of how long it took me through the day before I got my first screaming session. It was a little funny at first, but then it wasn't so funny anymore.

Junior Officer 6, although not personally affected by poor leadership, was disappointed by instances where junior officers made mistakes and the senior leadership fostered the perception that the junior officers could not recover from the mistakes:

I think that when you make a mistake you cannot come back from it. And that happened on both ships. Even though I admire my Commanding Officer and Executive Officer from both ships, we had instances where we had a young guy make a mistake and he could never recover from it. One guy fell asleep in After Steering during an UNREP, and got busted. He got all his quals pulled, which I agreed with. I agreed with him starting over. But he could never do anything right after that. Every single thing he did wrong. I mean, no matter how wrong it was, it was a huge deal. So he was never able to recover.

Junior Officer 7 was disappointed with the micromanagement that she encountered:

I feel like I work really hard. I never cut corners. I never cheat, if I can help it. I would never knowingly do those things and I just really get frustrated when someone asks me if I did or without saying, "Did you take care of this or did you make that phone call?" maybe just coming right out with the accusation, "Well, you must not have called." And I feel like I have to defend myself and say, "Oh yes I did. Let me get him on the phone. Let me show you that I did the job the right way or..." Situations like that. I feel like I'm a pretty intelligent, hard-working person and the last thing that I want to do is come to work and have someone throw something back in my face, accuse me of not doing a good job or just venting their anger on me because I am the person that is available. I really would just like to be treated like who I am, this hard-working, intelligent person. I will make mistakes, and I will roger up to those mistakes anytime, but please don't abuse me or yell at me for something that I didn't do, at least without giving me a chance first.

Junior Officer 9 also encountered numerous “screamers” in her chain of command and is disappointed with the Navy for promoting incompetent people and perpetuating the cycle:

The people were great and the people were terrible. So people, and if they're your bosses, like my first boss on [the ship], was a screamer and he was a madman. The first captain was a madman too, so it was just a perpetuating cycle and work was miserable. And life was miserable and you've probably had similar experiences at some point. And it is not necessary. It is an unnecessary misery. The First LT was actually [crazy], as well. And was a screamer and it was sort of that measure of incompetence that irks me. I would say that is part of the Navy's fault too by promoting incompetent people. I don't know if he was a woman hater but he was very threatened by women in the military, and he kept telling me, “Oh yeah, I got passed over because of some woman, and she only got promoted because she was a woman.” And on and on. He was...it gives me the creeps just talking about him. He was just a horrible person. And everyone...he was having affairs on the ship. It was just a terrible, embarrassing...it just undermines everything in the Navy, the chain of command, when that's going on. But to add onto it, the morality of it and he's supposed to be the leader and everyone knew about it. It was really terrible.

Junior Officer 10 was disappointed in the lack of teaching from the assistant department head:

I had an LDO as my Assistant Department Head and she really lacked personal skills. She really beat me down, and not very constructively. Not trying to teach me things but trying to make sure I knew that I screwed up a lot. In hindsight, I can look back and I can say, “Well, that was just Ensign stuff.” Paperwork experience that I didn't know, processes and procedures that I didn't know, that could have easily been fixed. So, I left there with not a very good feeling for staying.

Junior Officer 11 encountered the “brutal SWO culture” and was disappointed in the element of fear that factors into the leadership:

The SWO culture is brutal. It really is. So I will do everything that I can...I have learned to do everything that I can to make sure that my people are taken care of and protected. The leadership. The lack of leadership. The brutal, brutal SWO culture that just tears people up. Micromanaged, let's see and being blamed for things that were just out of my control, as a Division Officer, not me personally but overall the

division officers on that ship, me included; I was no different. Just being held accountable for things that we had no control over, yet at the same time having all the responsibilities to try to impact those things, and having that all ripped away from you at the same time. If that makes sense. That was my first ship. On the second ship, I had, the second Commanding Officer that we had on there was a brutal tyrant. Lead by fear. Almost kicked me off the ship twice, for insubordination. And it wasn't insubordination. It was just a matter of me speaking up, standing up to him, to protect either a watchstander fellow officer, or some enlisted people. Brutal man. He would physically hit people. Not me. Junior enlisted. Junior officers. Ensigns. He would physically hit people, brutalize them verbally. He fired people right and left. He fired the XO a million times during the deployment and then brought her back. That kind of thing. So, just a tyrant. It was ugly. Then the second XO was just brutal. And the only reason that he did not fire me, he let me know this, was because he did not have somebody to replace me. That was it. He just didn't know who else he would stick in there because nobody else could do it either. So that's kind of sad, when you just don't think that anybody on your ship can do your job, except for you, and you're the XO. That's kind of terrible. That was the lowest point in my career. The lowest point.

Junior Officer 13 cited careerism and micromanagement as her biggest disappointment in the leadership:

On the first ship we had a Commanding Officer who was very concerned about his own career. There were eight women on the ship and three thousand men. He really intended to make Admiral so anything that could potentially stand in the way of that became something that he gave a lot of attention to. There was a lot of micromanagement. With the exception on Tiger Cruise, everything that I did was micromanaged, I felt. That's hard to deal with. Also the feeling that if you do something wrong that it is the end for you.

Junior Officer 15 was disappointed in the way that her superiors never considered her input valuable:

But, there were times when you don't feel like you are treated like a professional or that your opinion matters at all. There is a complete disregard for you not only as a professional, but as a human being. I don't think that that was taking anything that I had of value personally or professionally. I thought that it was completely disregarded. If you were going to make that decision, at least come back and explain to me why. If

you are going to ask my opinion and then completely disregard it, then I think that warrants an explanation.

J: THEME IX: JUNIOR OFFICERS FEEL THAT INFORMAL REGONITION IS THE GREATEST REWARD, BUT THAT IT IS NOT OFFERED ENOUGH

1. Theme

Nine of the 15 Junior Officers felt that verbal expressions of recognition from their superiors were the most rewarding, but that it is not given as much as it should be. The officers view informal recognition as an easy way for seniors to express appreciation or confer reward, but yet it is very seldom that a verbal “thank you” or “well done” was put forward from senior officers. Junior Officers also deeply value informal verbal compliments from their subordinates.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 1 sees a verbal “thank you” from her superiors as an easy way to acknowledge a job well done, but there have been times when she has not received it:

Yeah, everyone needs a pat on the back and there have been a couple of times when I have busted my butt and nobody noticed. It is just sort of you go through [a challenging period] and all I need is a thank you, a verbal thank you telling me. And there have been a couple of times that that sort of slipped through, and that is a little disappointing, but that is not my motivator. I can live.

Junior Officers 5, 9 and 11 found the greatest source of recognition to be informal comments from their subordinates:

My personal favorite experience of being actually recognized is when we pulled back into port from my deployment, my first deployment. My second class petty officer, he called my stateroom and said, “Ma’am, just to let you know, us down in the shop we just want to let you know that you did a really good job, and if no one else tells you that we wanted to let you know that.” That meant the world to me and I think that will always be one of my favorite memories, definitely my favorite piece of recognition.

But the recognition is 100% from the guys that I worked for and with. Just everyday coming in and being able to help them with their own problems and then watching them perform, even if it is just keeping the ship clean. Sometimes they're simple, but what they are saying by doing a good job is that, "You're a good leader." And you've made their job clear to them or you've made their part in the whole make sense enough for them to want to do a good job instead of a half-ass job. So I think that the recognition definitely comes from the guys and of course, as a teacher here, when the students on the evals or just in passing will say, "You know this is the only class where I really get to think and get to talk about ideas." And if they love it, that is great, you know. That kind of thing.

One by one [the junior officers] did eventually start qualifying. And that was very rewarding for me because they came back to me and they would be like, "Hey, Nav, thanks for the help. Hey Nav, thanks." I didn't look for that stuff, but it was so good to hear that. Even in an environment like that, it was just great to know that I was doing something, and that was my goal. To just do something positive even though we were being completely crushed. It was good. The greatest recognition that I feel like I can receive is when it comes from my people. Like if somebody transfers out of the Navy, and this has happened, or they go off to another command, and I helped them with a career decision, when I get the phone call or the email a few months later, "Hey, thanks for everything. I'm doing great. This is what I am doing." That's just super.

Junior Officer 6 feels that a verbal expression of thanks from the Captain or Department Head serves as a great reward, because it can then be passed to her division:

I think that people in the military give up a lot. The only thing that they really get is the stability of a job. The recognition isn't there a lot of times, or, you know, sometimes all it takes is, "Gee, you did a great job. Thank you." See, I'm not all into awards and all that but I think when somebody says, "You did a great job," and you can go back and tell your guys that the Captain is so pleased with what we did, I think that that means more. That day-to-day, or week-to-week recognition for something that went well. I had a good chain of command, Department Head and up, but I think a lot of that, if you don't get it from above... and the Division Officers and Department Heads have to make sure that their people feel appreciated. It is very easy not to feel appreciated.

Junior Officer 8 believes that a verbal thank you from superiors in the chain of command can serve as a strong motivator, particularly for the junior officers:

Beyond just money, I think, especially as a junior officer, there are lots and lots of times when you work extremely hard and nobody ever says, “Hey, nice work.” You know? It is kind of expected of you, so that can definitely be depressing. For the most part, we are professional people and someone saying, “Hey, you did a nice job,” is just as good as having some kind of paper recognition or whatever. On the other hand, I don’t think that enough of that goes on and that is just informal recognition or whatever. I really think that those are the things that motivate best. Just a kind word from somebody who has looked at the job that you’re doing and recognized that you’re either really fulfilling expectations that maybe other people didn’t or you’ve gone an extra mile to do a good job. I think that’s definitely the most motivating thing around.

Junior Officer 14 also feels that verbal recognition from the chain of command is an excellent reward that is not offered enough:

I think that the most that anybody ever asks for is, “Hey, thanks.” There just doesn’t seem to be enough cookies thrown at us for the amount of hours that we put in. I joke about the letter of appreciation, but actually that is one of my favorite things that I have gotten. I was down in the bilge scrubbing because the Command Master Chief got on the IMC and asked for small little people. I’m about as, well I was a lot thinner then, but I was as small and little as you could get. It was my ship too and I wanted to pass the inspection. So that was...I actually felt like somebody took the time to say, “Thank you.” That is all I ever wanted. There was an evolution where we were doing an unrep with a British ship, so I put together my unrep brief and I get transparencies of what type of rig they were going to use, and the fact that they use metric and all this other stuff. Afterwards, I was up on the bridge on watch and the Captain pulled me out to the port bridge wing, which was odd because we usually hung out on the starboard bridge wing. He said, “I just wanted to tell you that you did a really good job.” I guess the look on my face was so stunned and he said, “Hasn’t anybody ever told you that?” I said, “No, sir. That’s the first time anybody has ever told me that.” Just every once in a while, just, “Keep up the good work.”

K. THEME X: MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FEMALE SURFACE WARFARE ROLE MODELS

1. Theme

The researcher asked the junior officers whether they, as female SWOs, have had any positive female role models to look up to. The majority of junior officers have not

had female officers as role models primarily because most have either not served with senior females or only served with one or two whom they would not consider role models. Ten of the 15 junior officers stated that they would have preferred to serve with senior female officers who they could look to as role models or mentors.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 2 would like to have female role models and thinks that it might improve retention for female junior officers if they could see women having a career and a family:

One thing that I wish we had, and you might feel the same way, is I have never had an experience where I have a senior ranking female to me to look up to as a role model or whatever. That might be why some of the women are getting out is because we don't see a lot of successful, 35-year old mothers who continue a career in the Naval Service. I don't know anybody that's doing that. So it is hard for me to say, "Boy, I could do it and it would be successful for me," when I don't have anybody to look up to and say, "I can do it because she did it."

Junior Officer 3 did have several female role models, although only one was a Surface Warfare Officer, and definitely saw the merit of having them:

The first one was the Supply Officer and the second one was a second tour divo and she had been on an FFT. They were both incredible role models as far as looking to see how females interacted with males in a professional sense, not that you didn't get that at the Academy. You certainly saw that at the Academy and growing up as a midshipman. But, to see it on a ship is different. You get to see how things work. I don't really know how to explain it, but they were really good role models and I asked them questions all the time. Nothing even female specific. They were just good division officers and a great department head.

Junior Officer 7 did not have any female officer role models, but looked to her senior enlisted. She does think that female junior officers need female role models:

I have [had role models] but they were not superior officers. I haven't had many of those. I definitely have had a couple of chiefs who have been excellent role models. The chief that I mentioned from [my ship], in particular, an EMC, basically taught me how to be an EOOW, an Engineering Officer of the Watch, onboard that ship. She was the first woman to qualify as EOOW. I do think women need female role models

and I especially think this because my husband has had very similar experiences to me, as far as his job, and yet his actual experiences as far as his relationship with people and the jobs that he has been tasked to do and his level of stress on the job has been very different from my experiences. I don't think that because his experiences as a man have been so different, I don't feel that he ever could have been my role model as far as how to conduct myself as a female leader of people.

Junior Officer 10 never served with senior female officers, but felt the example they provided could have been valuable in integrating the ship:

Actually I've never met another female SWO senior to me. Never met a female senior officer who was a SWO. And it wasn't until I came here, a year ago, that I had even met a senior line officer who was a female. I think it would have made a huge difference to have female role models and I think it would make a huge difference to other people as well. So the only role models that I had were men and, not saying that that is bad or anything that is inappropriate, I think in certain situations it would have made the integration of the female junior officers in the surface community a lot easier on everybody. I hope that when I go back to sea that I can do that for them. When I'm senior be their example because people didn't know what else to do.

Junior Officer 13 asked to go to an integrated platform for her second ship, but ended up getting orders to a ship with only 4 female officers. She wanted female role models, but assesses that there are still too few out there:

I wish...I had asked for female role models, but I guess they're still too young. As women in the Navy we are still pretty young.

L: THEME XI: ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME FORM OF DISCRIMINATION, MOST FEEL THAT IT IS BASED SIMPLY ON OLD PARIDIGMS OF WOMEN IN THE SERVICE AND CAN BE OVERCOME

1. Theme

The researcher asked the junior officers if they ever felt that they encountered gender discrimination or harassment in the navy, and what the impact was. The majority of the junior officers, 9 out of 15, felt that they had encountered some form of harassment

or discrimination, but for the most part it was relatively easy to deal with and overcome. Most of the harassment or discrimination stemmed from archaic beliefs regarding women in the service, and usually came from senior officers or senior enlisted personnel. The junior officers stated that they were able to dispel some of the antiquated paradigms that women did not belong in the Navy just by being competent and doing their job.

2. Justification

Junior Officers 1, 3 and 14 encountered senior enlisted personnel who often voiced their opinion that women did not belong in the navy:

My only instance where I felt me being a woman was an issue was on my first ship. My senior chief was very old Navy. It wasn't just him and me, he was just old Navy in everything, but we had a lot of conflict. Never saw eye to eye, and I attributed part of that to his strong personality, but I look back on it now and it was the first time that he ever had to work for a woman and that probably threw him for a loop. He retired a year after I got there, so he had done his time, but I'm a pretty easy-going person and I get along with everybody and that seems to be the only person that I could not get through to. I think we had a lot of ...he set me up for failure. Like I would find out things, like testing me and stuff, and I found out because I know that I have a good working relationship with people and they told me.

One of the chiefs on [the ship] when I was there truly, honestly and vocally, he would say this all the time, felt that women shouldn't be in the Navy. Not only shouldn't they be in the Navy, but they certainly shouldn't be in engineering. They didn't have any place in engineering. But everybody just kind of ignored it. He was just kind of spouting off. I stood watch with the guy. He was fine to stand watch with and he would just occasionally go off about females in engineering that shouldn't be there.

There was an interesting incident on [the ship]. I got in a confrontation with actually one of my subordinates who said that he didn't have to listen to me. He was older than I was. I don't think that he would have had that confrontation if it had been a male with him. With this altercation that happened between me and my subordinate I said forget it. I went straight to my boss; I had it all written out. I had a report chit on him. I mean I just wasn't going to put up with that. I think that comes with experience.

Junior Officer 5 encountered a department head who did not believe women should be in the military. The command took appropriate action to deal with the harassment, but all action was later rescinded:

Negative in that there was a department head who was very much in the old way of thinking where he didn't think women should be in the military and he made that very clear and through his actions, through his words. He said it to enlisted women. He said it to officers and no one did a thing about it until it got to a point where I said that I would write a letter of grievance to the command, and then they brought it up. The command actually did something after that point, and that was the positive thing about it. Well at least they got this guy out of there. They fired him. The negative thing with that was that I found out that his detailer called him and said he would scratch the whole thing from his record, and try and sweep this thing under the rug. So I know that he is out there and if that happens at my command, which was a very good command, that could happen at anyone's command and he could show up just as easily at anyone else's command and make all the females in that command, you know, make it a poor working environment. Or a hostile working environment. Horrible, horrible man. Here you had a problem, this guy was badmouthing females who, and even some actions of his were not particularly gentleman-like or officer-like, and finally it came down to this command actually did something, and actually fired him, but then it went to the next level and he went to the Group and everything was swept under the rug. And now he is out there somewhere.

Junior Officer 8 encountered discrimination from both senior officers and subordinates:

You could definitely tell that there were superior officers that didn't think that I belonged there, who didn't think that women belonged in the Navy. For the most part when there were other people around they would be very careful about what they said and did. Let me put it this way, before I left the ship one of the enlisted guys came up to me and said, "Hey, I thought that you did a good job while you were here. There were a lot more people throwing obstacles in your path than there were people trying to help you along," which I think is true. They were obviously very careful about how they did it because they could get in a lot of trouble if anybody could ever prove anything. It was tough. Here again, there were always people that you could tell didn't think that I belonged there. They would not refuse to take orders specifically, but they would definitely go out of their way either to cause problems or not help when they could have been helping. You just kind of have to get past that. Usually other people see it going on and they will compensate for it, so on the whole, it was overwhelmingly positive and we had a really good relationship. I would say there were a lot of cases where things were, maybe not made more

difficult for me, but certainly I didn't get as much help as other people did, both in terms of qualifying and things like that and also actual circumstances where I was trying to accomplish something. You know, somebody was standing right there who had the information that I needed or whatever and they just didn't say anything. So I know it happened, and I know that I'm not just being paranoid about it because other people noticed too and came and talked to me about it afterwards.

Junior Officer 11 encountered discrimination when she attempted to get qualified as a Boarding Officer:

But that discrimination was just ignorance on their part. The CO at that time was the first CO. He was a great guy. It's just that he had these old paradigms. He knew that he was the first Navy Destroyer that was going to allow women on the Boarding Team. He had to let the Commodore know, even though the Coast Guard had been doing it and everything. We were different, and I understood that. But the discrimination was there, but only because it was uncharted waters, and I'm not using that as an excuse but we tried it and we won. I know that there are women in the Navy who are doing boardings to this day. It is such a great thing

Junior Officer 13 encountered discrimination from the chief who was working for her, and after not being able to combat it, had him transferred to another division:

Did have a negative experience with my first chief. He was a brand new chief, and he did not want a woman. Absolutely did not, and made it very clear about it to the twelve guys who were [of a certain rate], who tend to be very young and immature, at least in my division. My chief would go away, he was at school, but he would come back at night, and all my guys lived onboard just about. He would say things about women and say things about me that would completely undermine my authority. He became the 3M Chief. And things became a lot smoother when I could deal with just the two First Classes and not have chief saying, "You don't have to listen to her." He was one of those guys who purported the old school, "I'm old school. I'm old school." And I think that old school has gotten misrepresented in a lot of ways. Insofar as "old school," I think, should mean respect other people, navy traditions, not "I don't like you because you are different." I think that is a misrepresentation and that it has been chosen as the word to represent the bad word.

M: THEME XII: BEING INVOLVED IN THE INTEGRATION OF FEMALES INTO SHIPS WAS NOT A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS

1. Theme

During the course of the interviews, 10 of the women expressed their views on the integration of women into ships, their involvement with it, and their opinions on the transition. The majority, 7 of 10, felt that the integration of women into ships was not a positive evolution and could have been handled better.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 2 had a challenge on deployment as she was the only woman onboard a large vessel:

The other challenge, which sort of happens to be a gender related issue, was on my second tour. I deployed with [an] ARG and I was THE ONLY woman on that ship, for a deployment and a whole workup cycle. I know that they had been prepped and super-prepped, and super-duper prepped by their CO, you know, “Don’t talk to her, don’t touch her...” You know what I mean. And it is hard to deal with that when people are under threat of, here’s this person who is going to come and disrupt the delicate balance on the ship. It was hard initially because I could really see that people had put up a barrier and it was not a bunch of 22-year old guys that put up the barrier. It was their Department Heads and the Captain of the ship that put it up for them. In their minds probably thinking, “Oh, I am just doing it to protect them.” But it was hard. He is thinking he’s doing them a favor. He’s not. He’s just continuing to perpetuate the myth of we need to be treated with kid gloves, which is not the case. So, although my experience on that ship was wonderful, I thought it was kind of a challenge because there was some resentment, I think, that they thought things had changed because I was there. I thought that just kind of perpetuated the stereotype of we come onboard and things change. Even though I didn’t mind it, I almost kind of thought, although I am going on this deployment by myself, that is not very good judgment necessarily by senior officers. If I were a senior officer, even though out of one side of my mouth I say, “I shouldn’t be treated any differently, therefore if I happen to be the only officer, female officer onboard, no big deal.” But in the other sense I think that they could have made things easier in that, I don’t know. I was really surprised that they did that. Just putting one woman onboard. I thought that was a little odd. It didn’t really bother me, but I was like, “Hmmm. That is unusual. I am surprised that they are

doing this.” So, I don’t know that that was just because I’ve been engrained over the years that when they put women on ships they try to put a few of them on there or whatever.

Junior Officer 6 felt that there were hurdles to overcome being one of the first women aboard her ship, but also felt that integration with more stages, such as staggering the inclusion of women by putting female officers onboard followed by female chiefs, then female petty officers, could have alleviated some of the problems:

Honestly, on my first ship I didn’t have any female enlisted and I got to the [ship] and there were four female officers and then we integrated six or seven months later. That to me was the most hassle. The integration. There are just a whole lot of problems that go along with the integration. You have people who don’t know how to talk with women there, get scared, don’t want to have anything to do with them because they’re like, “If I don’t say anything I won’t get in trouble.” Then you have the problem with pregnancy. Well the way that they should do it, I think is they do the officers first, but then, all of a sudden, you get all the enlisted. You don’t get the chiefs. You could get the officers and then get the chiefs. Then you have the chiefs there to help set the standard and the tone so that, “Hey we do our thing.” Then you bring them onboard by rank. Get the first class in there to go in and start setting the standard, then the second class and the third class, then everybody else kind of come in. They did a lot of training before we got there, so a lot of guys were like...you know, you walk down a p-way and they’re all braced up against the wall scared to touch you or whatever. We were four, probably four great people to have on there because we were not stuck up, but very outgoing and you know, “Why are you braced up against the wall? We’re not going to bite you or whatever.”

Junior Officer 10 served aboard a large amphibious ship, and felt that there should have been more senior female officers as part of the initial outfitting:

When I got to [the ship] it was going on its first deployment with women. There were only female officers onboard, no female enlisted. There were about 10 female officers, and 6 of them were boot ensigns. So the most senior women onboard were two lieutenants. One was a second tour divo and one was an Intelligence Officer. So that was kind of hard and there were growing pains. Not so much for me, but one female ensign was flown home during deployment, relieved for cause. There were a lot of rumors and general reputation things about some other of the ensigns. But I think because they were all ensigns, not like we had anybody to look to for support. I think that probably wasn’t very good planning.

Junior Officer 12 felt that there was not sufficient planning involved in the integration process:

I think it was the way that they threw us four females on a ship and that was it. They threw us on the ship and then they said, "Captain, you figure out how to accommodate female officers."

Junior Officer 15 felt that the integration was difficult primarily because of views of some of the sailors or officers who have never served with women before. She also thinks there is the perception of a double standard:

Some people still haven't had that opportunity, so it is new for them, but I think people are becoming more amicable to it. I think that they are realizing, as they see more and more women, if they go out there with the attitude that it doesn't matter and I am just here to do a job and I am dedicated and will do just as well if not better, that I care, whatever it is, you will lose that stigma of, "Oh, I have a female division officer now, or department head." It shouldn't matter. Eventually that will go away. Because women are a minority, they take on the label of the weakest link. By that I mean if you have someone that gets pregnant, the expectation is that everyone is going to at some point, or they are always worried about that. Or if someone makes a bad decision, then it is inherent that the rest of the females are going to make a similar bad decision or bad judgment or something like that. I'm not to say that women don't make mistakes. I have probably made ten today, but women, more so than men, take on those groupings of personalities. That annoys the living daylights out of me, probably more so than anything, is that perception. And that is frustrating because for every gal that gets in trouble there are probably five dudes that get in trouble, to the same magnitude, maybe varying magnitudes, but, quantity wise, ratio wise, it is pretty much the same. But, men don't take on that persona of the other guys, whereas women do. I think that you know what I am taking about. I hope that in the next ten to fifteen years the initial sensitivity goes away, that the people that go out there, I don't want to say blaze a trail, because I don't think it's that. I think that they live up to the expectations and live up to their own expectations of what they are hired to do. To get to the point and to be a SWO as an officer you have to aspire to do something. Well, live up to your aspirations and the expectations of others, and then we'll get rid of this hurdle or luggage or whatever, and then it will be normal. We will get to this phase where it is normal. In my mind that is where it is, but that's not in everybody's mind, so that is a challenge. And if we integrate more ships and don't have that 27-year master chief that has never even seen a female in uniform, ever, not come onboard an integrated ship, that's a good thing.

3. Analysis

As Hasty and Weber noted, the major factor driving retention in the military is leadership. “Poor leadership results in a dysfunctional organizational culture, a lack of focus, and a lack of trust in superior leadership that has driven many people to make the decision to leave the service.” (Hasty and Weber 2000, 211) The excerpts from the interviews with the female junior officers support this assertion. The most negative aspect of the majority of the tours was a direct result of the leadership. In the 2001 Junior Officer Retention Survey, the top factor that junior officers felt affected morale was command leadership, with a 33 percent response rate. Many of the junior officers interviewed supported the findings that a zero-defect, careerism mentality pervades through the organization.

Additionally, the female junior officers interviewed did not feel as if their senior officers addressed some of the issues they faced as division officers such as proper recognition and integration. As nine of the 15 female junior officers stated, they do not receive proper recognition for what they do. This was also found to be true by Natter, Lopez and Hodges who found that only 40 percent of the officers that they spoke with had received verbal recognition from a senior officer over a previous 30 day period. Junior officers are leaving the Navy because they are not recognized for the jobs that they do or the time they dedicate to do their job, and as a result, they feel underappreciated. The quality of life for officers in the Surface Warfare Community is primarily affected by the community’s “failure to take care of individuals.” (Wooldridge 1998, 28) Although, as Wooldridge notes, the community has “great people programs, all of which can be implemented, monitored, and glorified in press releases. Absent from our culture, however, is a sincere concern for individuals.” (Woolridge 1998, 28) For instance, as noted by 7 of the 10 female junior officers involved in the integration of females into ships, the process could have been run in a smoother fashion. The Navy has devised a plan to integrate ships, but there is no focus on how the individuals that are part of the process are affected. Although managing gender integration and the various issues that are associated with the process can often prove to be tedious, proper attention does need to be devoted to these issues in order to form a cohesive, team-oriented unit. As the

majority of the female junior officers who were involved in the integration process noted, although the end result was satisfactory, the process could have been a great deal smoother.

Another apparent element that has contributed to the perception of poor leadership is that mentorship has seemingly disappeared. (Hasty and Weber 2000, 217) Mentorship is a traditional strong point in the community and has been vital in developing junior officers into quality commanding officers and senior-level leaders. As Hasty and Weber note, “This heritage is so strong that despite its relative absence today it is still desired and valued.” (Hasty and Weber 2000, 217) One reason why junior officers desire role models and mentors is because they have heard stories from their senior officers relating to them the value of mentorship. Of the female junior officers interviewed, 67 percent strongly desire to have female role models or mentors. Although only one of the junior officers interviewed said that she had role models, most believed the lack of role models was due to the fact that there are not enough senior female officers in the community to provide the mentorship. Most junior officers interviewed had not served on ships with senior female Surface Warfare Officers. As the literature indicates, however, the dearth of role models may be an issue that is pervading through the community because of shortcomings in leadership, rather than a lack in numbers of the proper representatives to provide the mentorship.

N: THEME XIII: MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS PLAN TO GET OUT OF THE NAVY FOR FAMILY REASONS

1. Theme

Of the junior officers interviewed, 10 of the 15 plan on leaving the Navy, 3 of the 15 are wavering in their decision, and 2 plan on staying. Of the 13 who are either leaving or unsure of their career goals, 10 cited their desire to start or continue a family as their primary reason for leaving.

2. Justification

Junior Officer 1 is getting out of the Navy because of her desire to have a family:

The primary issue driving it for me is turning 30 about seven months ago now and I want to have a family someday. This lifestyle is not conducive to being single and having a relationship, or having kids. Fighting a clock, that I am more aware of now. I mean, it is something that I can't get away from. My window is narrowing and having a family is definitely a priority in my life. I haven't seen any officers with children, but I have seen senior enlisted females with children on the ship and it is not easy. So a desire to get married, have a family and have kids is my strongest reason, and to have a normal life.

Junior Officer 2 is recently married and plans on starting a family over the next few years. She does not want to be in the Navy when she starts her family:

The biggest thing for me is that I am 27 now. I am recently married. Not in the next year or two, but certainly within three or four or five years I plan on having a family. I don't know how many kids, one, two maybe three, but that, and for most of us, that falls right during the period that we are going to be department heads at sea. Our late 20's to early 30's, that's our department head years. So that's what weighs most on me. For the most part our getting married and child bearing years. For me, I am the type of person that I've seen the demand that it takes to be a department head, as well as be a good mother. And I personally don't think that I can do either of them well enough if I do them both together. So, for me they are mutually exclusive. I can't see that I can be a good mom and be going off to sea for six months, or doing workups. Maybe if I were married to a husband who had a stay at home job that would maybe work a little better. The big reason for me is that I don't see either of those things working into my life at the same time. I'm getting out because I know that I am going to be a mom at least for a couple of years, and a wife, and I want to be a very good mom and wife and I can't do them together with being a department head.

Junior Officer 3 has been deployed and left her child at home with her husband. She is getting out so that she can potentially spend more time at home with her family:

I have no regrets about the job, and the fact that my husband is at home with the kids makes it a lot easier to go away when I have to because I know they are not just being shuffled around to day care. But the time away is just so hard. And maybe I'll go out into the civilian world, and if I end up being the one who's working because we haven't decided yet, maybe I'll decide that that time away...maybe I'll be away just as much. I

don't know. But that is something that I need to try. I need to see if there is some other job that won't keep me away from my family as much. The other thing too is we want to have more kids. If I do the timing on that I could have another baby before I left [shore duty], but then I'd be going right to Department Head School and right to the ship. It gets harder when you think about having more kids.

Junior Officer 6 is married and plans on getting out so that she will not be on sea duty for the next four years when she plans on starting a family:

But I will be almost 35 or 36 before I had my first baby. That's the biggest thing. We are not ready for kids now, and once you go to Department Head School and do your tours, I mean, then I am 35 years old, so the biggest thing is family.

Junior Officer 7 also mentioned family as one of the reasons compelling her to leave the Navy. She does not see the feasibility of being a mother and a Surface Warfare Officer:

There have been times when I still had things that I needed to do on my to-do list and because I had already worked 10, 12, 14 hours, I decided to just close up shop and go home because I had neglected my husband or my home, the laundry, whatever. I feel like that if I really did everything that was expected of me in the Navy, if I had all my programs working perfectly I don't feel that I can maintain a decent home life. I certainly couldn't raise kids. I do not feel that my husband and I could continue on this SWO/Navy track and raise a family. I mean we were not even home enough in the past few years to properly support each other, much less to actually raise children properly. I simply would not want to raise a family and still be a SWO. And my husband is getting out for the same reasons too. I think that it is possible for some women. It just depends on where you set your priorities and allocate your time. I've seen women do it. I don't think that I could have been the kind of mother that I want to be though. If I had children and I really felt something was going on and I needed to drop everything and be with them, if my job prevented me from that it would be like a personal crisis. I mean I just could not. My job is not more important to me than my family.

Junior Officers 9 and 11 are getting married and do not want to be away for six months after they have children:

I was part of, certainly vehement in the fight to get in that we should have the rights and equal opportunity and then when we get here we all want to get out because we want to get married and whatever else. I think that

that's what is fundamentally the issue for me is that I am engaged and I am going to get married soon and I am going to have kids soon, and I am not going to be in the Navy when I have kids. I am not going to be in the Navy as a SWO. I think that is an important distinction because while it is difficult for a man SWO to have a family, it is nearly impossible for a woman to do it. Obviously I don't think it is compatible to have a family and be a SWO and that is why I'm getting out. I think there is something fundamental about, pretty obvious, being a woman and a mother and I think that the world is tough enough not to give your kid every advantage [by being around for them]. That is just how I want to raise my family. But, I think that if I put it in real terms it is because I am a woman and I really do want to spend times with my kids and I can't go away for six months plus all the other going away that deployment entails during the workups. It is a sacrifice that I could do to me but not ask from a family.

My fiancé and I are getting married in August. And we are looking at having a family and neither one of us wants to go away for six months at a time and leave our children. A week here, a week there, a month here and month there would be fine, but not the six-month deployments.

3. Analysis

Although only two of the 15 junior officers interviewed had children, family issues were a major concern. Of the two officers who had children, one officer was planning on staying in the Navy, while the other was planning on leaving. Both of the officers who had children did complete a deployment and left their child at home either with her husband or her parents. The increased stress associated with deployment, as related from the study conducted by Kelly, Herzog-Simmer and Harris, could have an impact on retention of female officers with children. Since there were only two officers interviewed who had children, it is difficult to draw any conclusion.

Family separation is one of the realities of sea duty. If, as Kelly Herzog-Simmer and Harris show, there is a significant increase in the stress level for mothers anticipating deployment, then this increased stress could contribute negatively to the "taste" factors associated with sea duty in the ACOL Model (Warner and Goldberg 1984). Additionally, the "stress" of the pre-deployment phase could also serve as a "shock" incorporated in the Unfolding Model of Employee Turnover. (Lee and Mitchell 1994) The officer would weigh the incidence of stress, and determine if she was willing to go through another pre-

deployment period. If the incidence of stress was too great, the officer may consider leaving the Navy to find another job where she would not have to leave her family.

Of the female junior officers planning on leaving or wavering in their decision, ten of the 13 cite family issues as their primary reason for leaving the Navy. Lee and Maurer investigated the effects of family structure on individuals' organizational commitment, intention to leave and voluntary turnover. (Lee and Maurer 1999, 495) The excerpts from the interviews support one of their premises that, based on the theory of human capital, the officers choose to economize their time and energy between work and family, and often have to choose and make sacrifices between the two. Most of the women interviewed did not feel they could be successful, on their own terms, at both raising a family and being a Surface Warfare Officer. Although most of the female junior officers did not currently have children, most anticipate they will be planning a family over the course of the next few years and did not view sea duty as a conducive environment to starting a family. As a result, ten of the 15 female junior officers interviewed definitely plan on leaving the Navy, and three of the 15, although wavering in the decision, cite family as the primary factor influencing them to leave the Navy.

Themes I through XIII analyzed the major reasons why the majority of the junior female Surface Warfare Officers interviewed are planning to leave the Navy. Themes XIV through XIX, analyze reasons why the senior female officers interviewed chose to make the Navy a career.

O. THEME XIV: THE MOST POSITIVE ASPECT OF SEA TOURS FOR MOST SENIOR OFFICERS IS THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERACT WITH PEOPLE

1. Theme

The senior officers were asked to describe some of the positive aspects of their sea tours. Ten of the 12 senior officers found it rewarding and motivating to interact with people and impact the lives of the personnel for whom they were responsible.

2. Justification

Senior Officer 1 finds it rewarding to see the efforts of the team come together:

I think one is the people and the individuals that you work with and the fact that you are a team. It doesn't work if you are not all in sync. I think it can be very rewarding to see a team come together and a plan executed the way that you want it to be executed. So that's rewarding.

Senior Officer 2 found her role as the Executive Officer to be the most rewarding job because of the positive impact that she could have on the lives of her subordinates:

And the leadership. I think that there is something cool about being the XO of a ship. I loved that. But, I like the leadership aspect. Where else, as a woman, can you be in charge of that many people? And the women who go to command, I think that is tremendous. Being in a leadership position, I know that I have positively influenced and helped people that may not have been able, in all different ways. And you know this as a former divo, you can make such a difference in people's lives just giving them a bit of advice, giving them some counseling, steering them in a certain direction. Maybe it is as simple as a recommendation, and evaluation, pushing them to go to a commissioning program or something like that. I get a lot of satisfaction out of that too. Now I can say if you decide to do the XO role, that the gratification that you get, because now you have some power that you can make an even bigger difference. I could pick up the phone, call classmates of mine that were XOs on other ships and say, "Hey, can you take so-and-so? His wife is having problems or whatever and take care of him?"

Senior Officer 4 was motivated by the intrinsic rewards of service in the Navy and the ability she has to make others' lives better:

I know people in all those walks of life and I don't think any of them compare with the intrinsic rewards that we get from serving our country, helping people be better people, and the fun.

Senior Officer 6 was driven by the impact that she could have on the lives of others, particularly when in command:

But if you are in charge of your own ship or even if you are not the one, the CO at the time, you have far more impact, at whatever level you're at, even if you are a new division officer, on what is going to happen in your day and other people's days than anything else, almost anywhere out there.

Senior Officer 7 enjoyed the familial relationship that she was able to have with the sailors that served for her:

They're a special breed, the Navy sailor, especially the Blue Jackets. They're a special type. I hadn't seen anything like that that I found on the ship where the ship is yours, and you are it. The crewmember is part of your family and I loved that. That is why I just kept staying at sea, staying at sea. I just didn't want to go to shore. They had to force me. And that's what kept me at sea and on ships. The Navy without sailors is not the Navy. What makes the Navy great are the sailors. The men and women who go to sea on the ships.

Senior Officer 8 found that the most rewarding part of the job is working with the sailors:

The best part has been working with the sailors. They have so much energy, and so much enthusiasm and I just feed off of that energy and it makes me want to do a better job for them. It makes me want to pull them together as a team and kind of get the mission done. That's been...it's like a great big family when you go to a ship. It is a big team effort. As your scope of responsibility gets bigger it is still the same philosophy. I have enjoyed that. My motivation right now as far as command goes, it was always to get to command. Now that I have screened for command, it is to have a good command where people want to come to work everyday and do their jobs and learn how to do things right and then they take that other places and sort of spread that philosophy around. So I really feel like I am still in a position where I think I can make a difference in the Navy. So that is a big...I've not been personally at commands, but I've seen other commands where people are miserable and they don't want to be there. I don't think it has to be that way. I think if you get enough good people to stick around and do things the right way, then...So, that's always been one of my goals to make the Navy better in my own small way.

Senior Officer 10 feels that she was motivated to choose the Navy as a career by the unique relationship that is fostered by the Navy culture:

The sailors. The sailors are great. You think something can't get done, you give them a task or a mission and they come up with the answers. They are pretty much why I stayed in. They are just great. I've talked to my friends who left. My older brother was in the Navy for nine years. He was enlisted. You can't get that level of trust and people being competent and knowing how to do their job and being on time. A lot of things we take for granted on ships and people we work with that they just don't have out in the civilian world.

Senior Officer 12 feels that the sailors continually motivate her:

So, sailors will keep you going no matter what. You have to do it for them if nothing else. It is that people are relying on me. It was just an incredible sense of wonderment that I had. I think my thing is that I have never lost that. With every thing that happens, you'll see a sailor do something extraordinary and it is actually some guy that you had doubts about, or something like that, and it gives me the same feeling. I'm just so proud of them and so proud of the job that they've done. You're standing there giving them a medal or recognizing them in some way.

P. THEME XV: SENIOR OFFICERS ENJOY BEING AT SEA AND DRIVING SHIPS

1. Theme

All of the senior officers interviewed spoke about their extreme passion for being out at sea and driving ships.

2. Justification

Senior Officers 1 and 9 enjoyed being at sea and having the opportunity to drive the ship:

The other thing is that I love to drive ships. That's the best part. But it really...it is pretty rewarding, I think, to feel like you have control of the ship, like you are controlling and conning it.

It has always been a very positive experience for me to be underway, and be on the bridge or in combat in a watch station position.

Senior Officer 2 was enthralled by ships growing up, and finds it thrilling to be able to drive them and understand their systems:

There is something about warships and dreadnoughts and destroyers with bones in their teeth that always sort of got me. It was always a thrill. Being able to do that and serve on those ships and go to sea and run them and learn how that works, it is interesting. It is a challenge. And the more people told me I couldn't do it, the more determined I was. But I was going to do it. But I was just determined that I was going to do it because it was different.

Senior Officer 4 enjoys the novelty of being out at sea:

I love being underway. I love being at sea. You really felt like you were doing something different, exciting, that sense of people was something special that you don't get when you work for Sears, or Lincoln Labs at MIT or whatever.

Senior Officer 5 enjoys the opportunity that is afforded to her from being underway to see parts of the world that some only hear about:

I love going over the horizon. I love going to all kinds of new places, if I've been there before, never been there before. I love, even stuff like the prosaic seeing parts of the sky that a lot of people that I know will never see, like the Southern Cross. Like in the Southern Hemisphere, you look up you see the Southern Cross and you think there are just hundreds of thousands, millions of people who will never see this particular constellation and I get to see it. I love looking on world map and looking at all the places that I have been. I like the idea of going on a ship.

Senior Officer 8 enjoys going out to sea because of the team-oriented, independent environment being away from the pier fosters:

I just love going to sea. I love being underway. Getting away from the phone lines, getting away from everything. You have this group of people and you have a great piece of equipment and you have X tasks to do and I think it is just fascinating to see how you can pull all that together to get something done. It is such a great feeling to actually have done something, as you know I'm sure.

Senior Officer 12 is extremely passionate about her love for the sea:

Looking back I can tell you the first time that I fell in love with being at sea. I was, I had qualified as Officer of the Deck and I served as a day watcher, whichever day watch it was, but it was a wonderful moonlit night up in the North Atlantic and I'd taken the mid-watch. I'll never forget when [the captain] popped off of his chair and he goes, "Well, DCA I'll be in my cabin if you need me." He walked out and closes the door to the bridge behind him, and I don't know if he slept in his life jacket or not, but it was such a glorious night and I remember going out to the bridge wing. I can remember the dampness on my cheeks and, but it was a cool breeze but still warm and I'll just never forget how wonderful that feeling was. I've had that same sensation many times. I had it when I took command and I went to sea for the first time as a Commanding Officer.

Q: THEME XVI: MOST SENIOR OFFICERS STAYED IN THE NAVY BECAUSE OPPORTUNITIES KEPT PRESENTING THEMSELVES

1. Theme

The researcher asked the senior officers what their commitment to the Navy means to them and at what point they decided to make the Navy a career. The majority of the women, 9 of 12, stated they did not have a defining moment in deciding to make the Navy a career, despite typically having 16 or more years of service. They also said that they were compelled to continue in the Navy because opportunities kept presenting themselves, and they were either enticed by the novelty of the prospect or they wanted to continue paving a path for women in the Surface Warfare Community.

2. Justification

Senior Officer 1 saw opportunities open to her and the potential to one day have command. She is still undecided as to whether she will stay because of the sacrifices she may have to make on her family:

But after my department head rides, I guess because it was more of a reality. More of a possibility, that if I want to keep pushing myself, there is an opportunity that I could command a ship. I guess just since it was a little closer. I just kind of kept staying in. I would say I'm not committed to making it a career now because I don't know what this next tour is going to bring. But I also know that if it doesn't work for some reason than it is okay at 15 years to walk away from it because it would be for the right reasons. It would be for my family.

Senior Officer 3 felt extremely fortunate to have the opportunity to serve on combatants:

Again, I was lucky that I had the opportunity to break in [to the combatant world] at SWOS. I was lucky that the Group Staff took me and then when I got there. I was lucky that they let me stand watch.

Senior Officer 5 was strongly compelled to succeed to form a reputation for the women that served with her and those that would follow her:

I think my guess is the reason that so many more women in that group stuck around, and by so many more I mean six instead of three, was

because they had, they were the first of the cadre, the first to go to sea, they had a lot to prove, they had been successful. I think they felt they had a tremendous stake in the organization to stick it out. And also, not very many of them are married, so they didn't have anything else to pull them out of there. So, but a lot of these women had tremendous stake in their success in the Navy because they were the first and because there is that feeling that you must not fail because if you're the only woman that these guys have worked with and you blow it, then your entire sex is impugned. But a lot of women, whether it is the right thing to think or not, tend to think that way. And I still think that way because I never seem to go anywhere where I am not the only women or one of just a few women. So I still feel, a lot is probably self-imposed, pressure to show what I can do, to show that their faith in me and allowing me to play in the boy's game is not misplaced, and that I belong. I think it's funny.

Senior Officer 6 stayed because she was continually offered opportunities for education and new adventures:

I never really did make a decision to stay. I really didn't. It was kind of like, well, I'll see if I am still having fun at points when I can get out, and if you think about it, I went to PG School so I owed some time. So they sent me to Department Head School and I had my first department head tour. After that, I was having a great time and then Desert Storm. Then they said, "We'll send you to War College." It kept going to things that I wanted to do and incurring obligations. Kind of, now I have 19 years in. So, I never really decided. When I joined up, I guess I was going to be CNO, but after that I never really decided. I just kind of liked what I was doing and then I figured when I don't like it anymore, that's when I will get out.

Senior Officer 8 was proud and excited by the opportunity to serve on combatants, and was also driven by her desire to create a path for those that followed her:

The chance to be able to [go to CRUDES] and to get picked to do that was just a great boost. I was just thrilled. It was so exciting. It was a lifetime dream come true to be able to do it. The other one has been to kind of be the path breaker. There are the women that I look up to; those people kind of pushed a little path as far as they could go. Those of us behind them continuing to push the path and make a way for the people behind us. I feel a lot of responsibility towards that. That's something that [a female officer] instilled in me when I was a young division officer is that you kind of have an obligation to the other women coming behind you to A- do a good job and B- keep pushing as hard as you can to make sure that... I may not be the first woman Battlegroup Commander, but maybe one of my divos will be, who was there when I was on [ship]. The further we

can get towards that goal, because it is the right thing to do. Women are just as capable, if not more, than men. It is just a matter of getting enough out there and keeping them in. Those kinds of things. And making sure they have the opportunity to stay in and do the things that they want to do. It is somewhat of a strange motivation but I still feel that responsibility. I just figured that when it got not fun, I would take a hike. But now that I have screened for command, I'm definitely going to stick around for that and that will take me to 20 years, so I guess now I made it a career. But I never really...it was never a conscious decision.

Senior Officer 9 continually had doors of opportunity opened to her, and was compelled to pass through them to forge a path for the women behind her:

In addition to having the opportunity open to me, just a history of positive experiences. Overall, I am pretty fortunate. And then I went to the DDG, the doors continued to open that presented a challenge to me that continued to present the kick that I got from being out at sea or being on the bridge. This is a very unique line of work. You just cannot duplicate it somewhere else. I have also been very determined to have a successful career in the Navy. I have sort of felt a responsibility to those after me to pursue openings or opportunities that became available. My retention was based on the fact that opportunities opened for women. I think that I had exceeded my level of challenge and reward after the destroyer tender. It didn't really feel like there was going to be much more for me, and I figured I had gotten a master's in Civil Engineering figuring I was going to transition to Civil Engineering Corps, and that it would be a little more challenging and exciting for me at the time. And they opened up the opportunities for women and I got Weapons Officer on [a combatant], and I figured that was the opportunity that I was looking forward to and it was now an open door, and that was the way to go. I think every step along the way has always been a positive step. On each tour, I developed, and I just kept stepping along. It has always been a step up, and an opportunity.

Senior Officer 11 felt that her entire career has been devoted to opening doors and paving the way for the female officers that followed her:

I am really proud when I think back of the changes that we have been able to institute that have allowed other people to press on and do things that they wouldn't have been able to do otherwise. I am so proud of the women that have been able to go to combatants. So I think what I am trying to explain here is that my whole career has been spent trying to build a process, build the bridges and allow that process, afford women the opportunity to do what they can be. My drive has been opening...and the reason that I have stayed is to continue. I have considered my role at least for the last seven or eight years, is to make sure that we continue to

broaden the opportunities. And we are just about there. Now we need to continue ensuring that the opportunities remain and the larger that we can make our pool, the more transparent our presence is going to be. Frankly, I think that is what we want. I want a Navy to exist that doesn't show gender. But remember when I, my generation, and I am still dating myself, is that there was that next goal to be had. We tended to do it because nobody had done it before. We have to press on to open that door. I think that was a part of my drive. I knew that I was the only woman up there and I was the only woman who was going to be available to do this. And I knew that I could do it. So let's open the door because once the door gets open they can't close it.

Senior Officer 12 was also a path maker and continually accepted the challenges put before her because she knew that she would be successful and be able to increase the opportunities for those that followed her:

The door opened and I stepped through it. It was more like, as much as anything, curiosity, kind of like, "Can I do this?" I think I can and I am going to go do it. And that's what I would go do. And I had a lot of fun doing it. It was important to all of us and I can not tell you what a driver it was, and I think that I am speaking for all of us because every one I know that I have ever talked to about this of my generation felt it so keenly, is that you simply could not fail. Because if you failed you failed for all women. If you want to talk about a motivator, that was truly a motivator and I kind of forgot about that. But, you could not fail. If you failed, you knew that all women would be judged by you and so whether you were a Boat Officer or you were leading the charge as the Damage Control Assistant somewhere. So, I guess it was one of those things where I don't think I ever decided that. I know that I wanted to do it, but I couldn't tell you when it was that I thought I could do it. Every time I've stepped up to the door, the door has opened.

3. Analysis

Not unlike many of the female junior officers, one highlight for the female senior officers is the ability to lead others. Ten of the 12 senior officers related stories of their interactions with their subordinates as their most rewarding times at sea. Most have found their interaction with sailors to be extremely positive, and have been satisfied with the impact that they can have on improving the lives of those who work for them.

Additionally, the senior officers interviewed related stories regarding their love for being out at sea and driving ships. The comments that they provided take on an almost ethereal quality regarding their memories of driving ships, or when they first realized that they had a strong desire to be on ships. Although the ACOL Model states that the higher the incidence of sea duty the less elastic the reenlistment supply curves will be, other “taste factors” of the model would increase the non-pecuniary values of sea duty. With the senior female officers purporting their strong desire for sea-going billets and their love for being out at sea, there are few other careers outside of the Navy that would provide them with the satisfaction that they receive from being on sea duty and driving ships. Captain Wooldridge states that he believes his generation of Surface Warfare Officers had more fun than the current junior officers. As he asserted, “We knew what we were doing was important, were willing to sacrifice to achieve the mission, and obtained tremendous satisfaction from doing our jobs to achieve our mission, and obtained tremendous satisfaction from doing our jobs right.” (Wooldridge 1998, 28) He believes that the junior officers of today are laden with the administrative taskings and nontraditional missions which detract from a clear understanding of the combat role of their job. Although he believes these missions and jobs are important, they “just don’t provide the same thrill—nor, more important, the same pride and sense of accomplishment—as meaningful operations at sea.” (Wooldridge 1998, 28)

Most of the senior female officers were also motivated to stay in the Navy because they wanted to continue to pave a path for women in the Surface Warfare Community. As Part I of the literature review reveals, when the senior officers who were interviewed were first commissioned in the Navy, 1976 through 1988, the opportunities for women were limited. Although women were assigned to a hospital ship in 1972, it was not until the summer of 1978 that women received orders to Surface Warfare Division Officer Course. In the fall of 1978 the first wave of female officers were assigned to noncombatants to include repair ships, tenders, tugs, and research ships. Although women were allowed to serve on ships, there were virtually no billets available for them to serve as executive officer or commanding officer. They were confined to the mid-grade officer billets, and as a result their progression in their careers as Surface Warfare Officers was limited. It was not until 1987, when 26 ships in the Combat

Logistics Force were designated as noncombatants and opened to women, did women have a viable career path in the community. As these ships opened to women, the opportunity for command became a possibility, and the promotion of females in the community was now commensurate with their male peers. During this time period, many of the senior officers interviewed were serving as newly commissioned officers. The changing policies afforded these women the chance to be the path makers for women in the Surface Warfare Community. This was also a motivating factor for many of the senior officers interviewed.

R: THEME XVII: MOST SENIOR OFFICERS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION OVER THE COURSE OF THEIR CAREER

1. Theme

The researcher asked the senior officers if they felt they have received the appropriate recognition for the jobs they have done. Nine of the 12 senior officers felt that they have received appropriate recognition, and 3 of the 9 said that they had received too much recognition. The senior officers, in general, felt that they have been sufficiently recognized, both formally and informally, over the course of their career.

2. Justification

Senior Officer 1 feels that the community rewards people effectively:

I do feel like I get the right type of rewards, or in general the community rewards people properly. Personally, the things that are rewarding to me is when I feel like I've gained the respect because I've proven that I deserve, well I don't know about deserve, but I've earned someone's respect as a professional, as a Surface Warfare Officer. I would like to see more with regards to bonuses for our community.

Senior Officers 4, 6 and 9 all feel that they have gotten too much recognition, often because of their gender, for the jobs that they have done:

Absolutely I get way more recognition than I am comfortable with often. The rewards are just...the tangible rewards are obviously good fitreps,

promotions, leave all of those things that we aim for and that mean so much, not only to continue our careers, but also need to be recognized. The intangible rewards are certainly feedback from the boss, positive strokes.

I got way too much recognition on [the deployments that I went on]. The U.S. Navy coming [to a foreign country] is a huge deal and then to have a female CO was an incredible deal in that. So I got a lot of recognition there. And it really wasn't right because my guys did so much work to get all the receptions that we did and the whole flight deck. But not just that, all the actual operations and training exercises that we did with all the folks in [various countries]. Those guys did so much, and I was getting all the recognition really, so I didn't like that very much. I get...you get noticed. If I stand in a crowd of other naval officers, they're going to notice me because which one of these is not like all the rest, even just from my size alone. So, I get noticed more often, so I can't say that I have not gotten enough recognition, put it that way. What is rewarding for me really is one of my guys, they say, "Thanks for helping me out," or "Thanks for showing me how to write like that. Thanks for taking the time to do an endorsement for me for..." A bunch of my guys on [the ship] still write to me from my wardroom. I find that very rewarding for me that they still remember that I exist. And that is what is rewarding to me. I don't need awards. I like those guys getting recognition because they like it. Like the ones who want it, care about it, get it. I guess what is rewarding for me is for people to see their dreams come true or to have opportunities to pursue them.

Yes, and probably more than I should. Probably because of my gender. I don't know that, but I would suspect that maybe there is a sense that I am unique. Like that function on Wednesday. He picked me out and spotlighted me. I felt very uncomfortable with that. I thought that was not...I understand why he would want to do that because he wants other women to feel that they have a future and that they have a place to go, whereas otherwise they might not know that, but I find it very uncomfortable to be singled out and to get the recognition that any of the other officers in that room deserve.

Senior Officers 7, 8 and 11 feel that they have gotten the appropriate recognition, but that the most rewarding appreciation comes from their subordinates:

Every time a sailor asks me to reenlist him and every time a retiring chief petty officer asks me to be their guest speaker. And that's happened several times. That's what makes it worthwhile. I know that I have done my best and I've taken good care of my people. Every time my chiefs made Warrant or LDO or Senior those were the things to look for. That's

my reward. Once again, going back to the sailor, chiefs and below, you take that with you as you move on through your career and you make.

I feel like I have gotten the appropriate recognition. I guess the biggest reward is someone saying they would like to serve with you again, especially a subordinate. The medals and all the stuff from above don't really mean anything. It is just going to go in a shadow box someday. It's not really that big of a deal. But the complements from below are a lot better and a lot more important to me personally.

I worked with this one sailor, and now he is a third class. That's the payback. I got a message not two days ago from a youngster whom I really am very, very fond of. He was my mess crank on the ship. My second mess cook. Very talented young man and he wrote to me and said, "I made third class, but I just got my Surface Warfare Pin. I wanted you to be the first of the ship to know. I am so proud and thank you for pushing me to get that Surface Warfare Pin." That's the rewards that I get. So the reason that people stay now, or in my opinion the reason that I have stayed is for the intangible rewards that I get from my people.

S: THEME XVIII: MOST FEMALE SENIOR OFFICERS HAD FEMALE ROLE MODELS

1. Theme

The researcher asked the senior officers whether they, as female SWOs, have had any positive female role models to look up to. The majority, 8 of 12, stated that they have had role models at one point or another throughout their career. The four officers that did not have role models were some of the first females assigned to the non-combatants.

2. Justification

Senior Officers 1, 2, 3 and 8 found role models in some of the senior women whom they encountered onboard their first ships when they were ensigns:

When I was an ensign [the ship], there was a woman who was our XO and she was sharp and she was really squared away. She had her first child right after her XO ride and she never went back to command. She jumped off the fast track. She did it for personal reasons. She's the one person that I think, because I served with her, and I know how great she

was. It really was a let down to see her not go on to command because I would have killed to work for her again. But everyone is just a little different, so I will never be able to find someone who is duplicating what I am trying to duplicate. So, the variables are different in each case and you just can't compare. But you certainly gain confidence by seeing how other people do it or what their issues are. I think it is harder to find them, not just because, well for the reasons that I just explained. I mean, it is just harder to type them into role model category because there are so many variables.

[Officer] who was the [billet held] on [the ship]. She paid a price too and she announced to me when I ran into her last, she said, "You know, I realized that if I couldn't have a successful personal life, that is a husband and a family, that I was just going to have to make a success out of my career." She has. She's done marvelous. She's had major command and she's wonderful. The other was my Executive Officer on [the ship], who picked up O-6. But again, she paid the price. She wanted to have a family, wanted to get married, wanted to have kids and hasn't done either. But she said she's successful in the Navy. She feels that if you can't have it all at least she's had a successful career.

Oh sure. There are some great women out there. One of the first women that I ever met, who I kept running into, was Captain [Officer] who is now retired unfortunately. She was one of the most professional and most diligent people. I just always aspire to be as professional as she is. She seemed to know so much about everything and be so aware, so self-aware, so self-confident. I always admired that. Captain [Officer] who is in Norfolk. I think she's at [command]. She's one of the most outgoing people that you are ever going to meet. A great officer. She is really enthusiastic about the community as a whole. She is enthusiastic about women in the community. Everyone who works for her loves her. She's quite a character too boot. Really enthusiastic about everything.

[Officer] was just great. She was a great example. And there was another person, [officer] who was, she's retired now, but they were both really great leaders. Probably [those three officers] would probably be the people that I still consider to be kind of my role models. They were organized, and they were fair and consistent. Those are probably the best attributes. The other thing is they kind of took me under their wing. Me and all the other JOs. I don't think they just took me under their wing. But to show us how to do things, how to use a common sense approach, management by walking around. Those kind of philosophies that...they were just good leaders. And I liked having the opportunity to just watch them and see what they did and kind of copy their style. The sailors respected them. Their peers respected them. The COs respected them.

And so, they were good people to have as role models. I just think it is important to have other role models especially when you're more junior than I am. I don't know. This is just for me, but it was nice to see that there were other people up there that are making it because it kind of gives you hope that you could be up there too. If there weren't any women going to be COs of DDGs right now and I was an ensign and I wanted to be the CO of a DDG well it could inspire me to be the first one, or it could say, "Well, that's never going to happen. I'm going to find something else to do." So I think it is good to have role models.

Senior Officers 10 and 11 also found female role models during the course of their careers:

[Officer]. She was the first woman XO of a ship and the first CO of a ship. She would take the time to talk to us, if you ever ran into her when she was on shore duty. And [officer] is just a great lady. And in my case, [officer]. She's one of the first ones to go into...she went into the Logistics Navy as XO the way that I transitioned into amphibs.

[Officer]. She was the first woman aviator to be offered major command at sea. She turned it down because she wanted to have a family. She survived a lot. She is the only person that I really had to look up to as a role model. But she also broke down a lot of barriers. As far as someone to talk to, it was [2 officers]. Great women, both of them and made great sacrifices. One turned down major but had done a tremendous amount of sacrificing to get there, allowing others to at least be considered. But those are two people who I looked up to and had it not been for them, I don't know that I would have had the personal courage to continue. I would like to think that I would have, but I don't know.

3. Analysis

Of striking contrast to the excerpts garnered from the junior officers, the female senior officers interviewed felt that they had received appropriate recognition and had female role models. The recognition the senior female officers refer to is often clarified with the fact that they believe often they received recognition because of their gender. Since there were so few women in the community during the late seventies and early eighties, the women did stand out because of their gender. Additionally, a great deal of public focus was placed on them because as opportunities opened to them, their accomplishments were newsworthy. Almost all of the senior women interviewed were

spotlighted at some point in their career for being “the first woman” to accomplish a task; some were in the first group of women to deploy in combat, others were the first to serve on amphibious ships, and still others will be the first to take command of Aegis Class Destroyers.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the majority of the women interviewed said they had female surface warfare role models. As Karsten notes, “studies show both boys and girls, after being shown a woman in a ‘nontraditional’ career, believed a woman could and should perform that role. This is a clear example of the importance of role models.” (Karsten 1994, 119) A distinct advantage of having a same-sex role model or mentor is that there is a greater possibility of psychological identification. People identify with those similar to themselves; therefore, role models of the same-sex may be more credible and perceived as being better able to distinctly understand encountered challenges. (Karsten 1994, 119)

Most of the senior female officers interviewed mentioned the same role models. Since there were so few ships open to women in the early eighties, most of the women interviewed have, at one time or another, served with the others interviewed. Many served on ships together and have stayed in contact throughout their careers.

T: THEME XIX: SENIOR OFFICERS DO NOT FEEL THAT THEY HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES WITH REGARDS TO FAMILY

1. Theme

The researcher asked the senior officers what major sacrifices they have made by choosing a career in the Navy. Although most of the women made reference to family, 8 of the 12 interviewed did not view that as a major sacrifice.

2. Justification

Senior Officer 1 does not feel that she has made any sacrifices, although she does wonder what she might be doing if she had not chosen a career in the Navy:

I haven’t made any sacrifices. I’ve often wondered where I would have been and what I would have been doing if I hadn’t jumped into this big,

black hole, which is what it was, a while back. I don't consider that to be a sacrifice. I just...that's mere curiosity.

Senior Officers 3, 4 and 9 do not feel that they sacrificed having a family because not having a family was a decision they made prior to joining the Navy:

Certainly I guess you could say that you sacrifice a home life and a family. I was never specifically focused on that to begin with. So I don't know if I have missed that much there, but when you move constantly there is definitely a stability factor that you don't have.

We all make sacrifices. I never wanted to have children, so that was never a sacrifice.

I also never felt family was a sacrifice. The determination I made regarding family was without consideration for my career. I made it prior to coming in the Navy.

Senior Officer 5 does have children, but she had them late in her career and will not have to go to a sea going billet nor deploy, and leave her children behind:

Well, they really didn't seem at all like sacrifices until I had kids. Since I had kids kind of late and the majority of my career I've not had the guilt complex that I had to deal with because I had kids.

Senior Officer 7 thinks that because of the time away, time with her family is given up, but that it did not contribute to her sacrificing a family life:

No, I didn't really sacrifice much. And I'm not talking a husband and children, because I've never married and that's probably helped my enjoyment in that I didn't have to leave a family behind. But in the end I did leave family behind but not my husband and children.

Senior Officer 8 feels that although she desires to have a family at some point, she can wait until her career will allow for it:

And it said, "You can have everything you want in life, you just can't have it all at the same time." So, I'm kind of taking that approach to life. That right now I'm in the Navy and that's what I want to do. Then when I am done being in the Navy, then I will do other things that I still want to do. I don't feel that I've really missed anything yet. I have said in the past, "If I die without having a baby I'm going to be really pissed off." But, I still have...I'm 36. I'll be 37. I still have about four or five years left of the

opportunity to have one on my own and after that there is always adoption. So I don't feel like I've missed out on anything. Not yet, anyway. I don't think I will. I've always said, and I started saying this when I was an ensign, that I didn't want to be somebody who retired from the Navy with an admiral's blouse hanging in my closet and nothing else in my life. And I have really tried hard to make sure that I didn't become like that.

3. Analysis

As Lee and Maurer claim in their study, “employees make overt and volitional choices about the time and energy spent in work versus family roles.” (Lee and Maurer 1999, 495) In contrast to the junior officers, a striking majority of the senior officers interviewed chose to dedicate themselves to their occupations very early on in their careers. The senior officers interviewed outlined their lives to incorporate career first and then family. For some this was a decision made before they joined the Navy because they did not desire to have their own family. For others, they initially dedicated their time and energy establishing their careers, with the goal of establishing a family at the end of, or after, their career. They are able to focus on their career accomplishments, without the notion of major sacrifices, because they “see themselves as successful on their own terms.” (Powell and Mainiero 1993, 210) They established their goals and priorities fairly early in their careers. As more opportunities opened to them they were able to achieve more than they ever believed they would at the outset of their careers, and thus had an increased sense of career success.

U: CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter IV presented the major factors that female junior and senior officers are considering when determining whether to stay in the Navy. The major factors that junior officers consider are economic, sea duty taste factors, leadership in their chain of command, and desire to have a family. Senior Officers, though at a different point in their careers have considered sea duty taste factors, to include their ability to impact the lives of others and their love of the sea, their desire to forge a path for women in the community, and the positive influence of the leadership they encountered.

Chapter V summarizes the findings of the themes presented in this chapter, provides recommendations for improving the retention of female Surface Warfare Officers, and offers areas for additional research.

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

A. SUMMARY

This study focuses on determining the factors that affect retention for female officers in the Surface Warfare Community. The study focuses on the experiences and perceptions of junior and senior female Surface Warfare Officers through the ideas garnered from in depth interviews. The study found several unique factors that are important in explaining female Surface Warfare Officers' decisions to stay in or leave the Navy.

The interview data, presented in Chapter IV, indicate that there are myriad factors than affect an individual's retention/separation decision. Although many of the reasons cited by the female junior officers are similar to the reasons that all officers in the community are choosing to stay or leave the Navy based on the 2001 Surface Warfare Junior Officer Survey, the interviews provide more insight into the thought process that the female officers go through and the issues that weigh more heavily on female officers. Based on the research, the data regarding the decisions that female officers make to either stay in the Navy or leave lead to four broad categories of factors that affect decision-making.

1. Economic Factors

Theory suggests, "While sea duty has a negative effect on the first-term reenlistment rate, it appears that its adverse effects are readily controlled by bonuses." (Warner and Goldberg 1984, 34) Based on rations of elasticity, Warner and Goldberg in the Annualized Cost of Leaving Model, conclude that the higher the incidence of sea duty, the lower the elasticity of the reenlistment supply curve. However, the Model also stipulates that the negative impact that sea duty has on the elasticity of reenlistment supply curves can be counteracted with adequate monetary compensation in the form of bonuses.

Although Warner and Goldberg have statistically proven this theory to be true using enlisted personnel as their subjects, the data from the interviews with the female junior officers suggest that bonuses are not currently adequate to compensate for the negative impact of numerous non-pecuniary factors associated with being a female junior Surface Warfare Officer. The female junior officers interviewed would prefer that policy makers in the Navy address, and attempt to solve, root causes for the problems in the community, rather than offer additional money. This theme is supported by numerous commentaries on the military asserting that the problems in the military are not about the money. (Hasty and Weber 2000; Wooldridge 1998; Horton and Hatten 1998; Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998)

2. Navy “Taste Factors”

Through the data gathered from the interviews, numerous themes suggest positive aspects of sea duty and a career in the Navy. Numerous “taste factors” are associated with sea duty and the jobs than an officer will undertake in her career path. Some of these “taste factors” include impacting the lives of the sailors, being underway, ship driving, operational mission taskings, and the intangible pride in service to country.

The factors listed above contribute to the monetary value associated with the non-pecuniary element of sea duty. Based on the interviews, these factors would increase the value of the sea duty when applying the value to the ACOL Model. There are many positive aspects associated with sea duty and the jobs that Surface Warfare Officers have while in sea going billets. One of the most positive aspects of the billets that Surface Warfare Officers have is the leadership opportunities and the ability to impact the sailors that work for the officers. Both the female junior officers and senior officers noted the importance they placed on leadership and influencing others.

The opportunity to lead is one of the primary draws of the Surface Community. In an article relating to the ensigns of the fleet today, Kacher notes, “leadership is why they joined the Navy and they are anxious to get started.” (Kacher 1999, 51) As supported by the data from all of the female officers interviewed, the leadership opportunities found at all levels and all billets on sea going vessels, and the extreme

satisfaction acquired from the ability to impact the lives of the sailors on the platforms are two of the highlights associated with sea duty.

Additionally, most of the officers interviewed find certain aspects of the operational requirements to be rewarding. Achieving the qualifications required of Surface Warfare Officers is a peak experience for 9 of the 15 junior officers interviewed. Senior Officers spoke of ship driving and sea duty with an almost spiritual overtone. This supports the commentary by Captain Wooldridge. He believes that his generation of Surface Warfare Officers truly enjoyed the job that they were doing. They found the operations that they were involved in to be meaningful and “geared to combat a real-world threat,” and because of the fun that the officers had during port visits. (Wooldridge 1998, 81)

Two of the themes garnered from the interviews with the junior officers provide reference to some of the negative aspects, or “taste factors”, associated with sea duty. As Lee and Mitchell assert in their Unfolding Model of Voluntary Employee Turnover, as employees encounter various “shocks” in their occupation, they analyze the desirability of their current employment situation. These two “shocks”, the time spent at work and the lack of intellectual stimulation, could serve as the impetus necessary to initiate one of the four proposed psychological processes employees use when deciding to leave an organization. In Decision Path 1, a shock to the system elicits the recollection of a similar shock, situation and response, and a decision is enacted based on the previous situation or thought process. Decision Path 2 involves a push decision, whereby a shock causes an employee to evaluate her desire to remain in the current organization. The decision to remain in the current organization occurs without specific job alternatives and is based solely on an employee’s attachment to the current organization. Decision Path 3 involves a pull decision, whereby a shock causes an employee to evaluate her desire to leave the current organization. Decision Path 3 is accompanied by at least one specific job alternatives, and the employee focuses on whether her needs and goals could be met in another organization. Finally, Decision Path 4 does not incorporate a shock, but rather, over time, and employee may believe that her goals and values are not being met in the current organization.

Most of the female junior officers interviewed have considered the vast amount of time that they spend at work, and have decided that they would prefer to spend less hours at work and be in a job where they have more flexibility to balance other facets of their life, such as raising a family or pursuing additional education. Female officers typically do this analysis during the four years they spend on their first two sea tours. For example, the amount of time that a female junior officer spends at work could fit into Decision Path #2 of the Lee and Mitchell Model where the officer receives a shock, the amount of time dedicated to work, analyzes that shock without any specific job alternative, and makes the decision to leave based merely on the strength of the perceived shock and the job dissatisfaction resulting from it. The decision is primarily based on the “push” theory, where employees leave an organization based on internal conditions.

The lack of intellectual stimulation falls into Lee and Mitchell’s Decision Path #4. Although there may be no perceived shock, over time the female junior officers have determined that the values or goals of the organization are not aligned with their personal goals. Of the 13 officers who are planning on separating or still considering their options, 8 plan on pursuing additional education, not only because they do not feel that they have not received adequate intellectual stimulation from their time in the Navy, but also, in some cases, because they have been introduced to additional studies, as a result of continued education that they pursued in their off-duty time, that they find interesting and desire to follow.

3. Leadership Factors

Female junior officers have been extremely disillusioned with the leadership they have encountered since joining the Surface Warfare Community, causing many of them to decide to leave. The female junior officers interviewed did not feel that their superiors listened to their concerns or that their superiors appreciated them. Furthermore, they were disappointed with the lack of female role models in the community. Although most of the female junior officers were able to recount stories regarding issues of discrimination or harassment, they did not view these aspects as particularly serious, and felt that time would diminish any discrimination in the community. The female officers

did, however, feel that the integration of females onto ships could have been a smoother process.

In contrast to the attitudes and perceptions of the junior officers, the female senior officers did feel, over the course of their careers, that they have received appropriate recognition and were able to find female role models in the community.

As Hasty and Weber assert, the major factor contributing the low retention rate in the military is leadership. (Hasty and Weber 2000) Myriad negative influences evolve due to shortcomings in leadership; dysfunctional culture, lack of focus, lack of trust in the chain of command, and lack of mentoring. (Hasty and Weber 2000) These negative influences play a strong role in decreasing the monetary values assigned to the non-pecuniary factors in the ACOL Model, and, as a result, could serve to greatly decrease the elasticity of the supply curve for reenlistment rate. Leadership is the key to improving retention.

The female senior officers, although they could also relate negative aspects of leadership, were able to relate more characteristics of positive leadership in the community. Utilizing the constant comparison method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the data garnered from the senior officers regarding aspects of leadership were more positive than the interview data from the female junior officers. As the female senior officers related much more positive aspects of leadership (Wooldridge 1998; Hasty and Weber 2000; Kacher 1999; Wallace 1998; Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998; Hatten 1998), it can be inferred that this would increase the positive value of the non-pecuniary “taste factors” associated with a career in the Navy, as applied to the ACOL Model. The female senior officers interviewed spoke of numerous positive facets of the leadership that they encountered, such as mentorship, recognition and opportunities. These encouraging aspects of the leadership the female senior officer encountered directly contributed to the overall positive experience of their careers, and served as a compelling reason to stay in the Navy.

4. Family Issues

A striking difference between the data acquired from the female junior officer and senior officers relates to family issues. The data suggests that the family issues for the female junior officers is a major concern that is contributing to their decision to leave the Navy, whereas the majority of the senior officers interviewed did not have children and did not feel this was a sacrifice generated by their Naval career. Most junior officers did not feel they could adequately dedicate their time to be successful Surface Warfare Officers, particularly as Department Heads, and parents, to include having children and raising the children. They feel they cannot economize their time between work and family, and be successful in both activities. In defining family concerns, the female junior officers focused on family planning and the physical and psychological demands with having a child, as well as the time that they would spend at work that would detract from the time that they could spend actually raising their children. Based on the theory of human capital as applied to voluntary employee turnover (Lee and Maurer 1999) an employee often has to choose between work and family and make sacrifices between the two to economize time.

The majority of the female junior officers interviewed have decided that they will not be able to economize their time in a way that is satisfactory to them to allow them to balance their time and energy between being a Department Head and rearing a family. Many also see the four years that they spend as Department Heads on sea duty as the prime time for considering and starting a family. As the majority of the officers at Department Head School are in their late twenties to early thirties, most of the female junior officers viewed this is the best time to start planning a family. Following Department Head School, the officers will go to sea duty billets for at least 36 months. Most women understand the negative stigma that is associated with getting pregnant while on sea duty and also understand that they will be transferred to a shore duty billet. As such, the majority of the junior officers interviewed are either leaving the Navy or contemplating leaving because they do not see any flexibility regarding family planning during the three or more years that they will serve as a Department Head.

The female senior officers interviewed had a different perspective. The majority of the senior officers, 8 of 12, did not view dividing their time between family and work, or not having a family, as a major sacrifice imposed on them by choosing a career as a Surface Warfare Officer. Many of the senior officers interviewed decided early on in their adult lives, that their careers were their top priority. Of the senior officers interviewed, 9 of the 12 did not have children. The absence of family as a competing priority allowed the officers to dedicate their time to managing their careers, and did not add the negative aspect of separation from family, most notably children, that the female junior officers are hoping to avoid.

As Powell and Mainiero propose, and as Keegan relates in her thesis, there are two patterns that women follow regarding the timing of motherhood and careers: a simultaneous pattern whereby women have children and a career at the same time, or a sequential pattern whereby women pursue either children or a career first. The sequential pattern can then take on three distinct paths: motherhood follows employment, employment follows motherhood, or employment brackets motherhood, where the mother interrupts her career to raise her children and then resumes employment (Powell and Mainiero 1993, 202-203; Keegan 1999, 102) Although it is becoming more common for men to take on the primary parenting roles, as Powell and Mainiero note, “decisions about the timing of parenthood have a profound effect on women’s lives due to the inescapable reality of the biological time clock regarding motherhood.” (Powell and Mainiero 1999, 203) The junior officers are at a position in the life where they are serious contemplating their future desires regarding having a family, and since females who are pregnant are transferred from sea duty, most do not see the plausibility, or have the desire, to work their family issues around their sea duty commitment. The female junior officers are choosing the path whereby employment brackets motherhood. Most of the junior officers interviewed do desire a career, but since the Navy does not offer an option for Surface Warfare Officers to interrupt their career to have and raise their children, the female officers will seek a career outside the Navy. This will allow some feasibility for them to leave their jobs and resume working when they personally decide.

For the senior females who chose to have families, or who are still considering having a family, they have chosen a different route than the junior officers are

considering. The senior females have either chosen the simultaneous route, where they had their children after their Department Head tours, or on shore duty prior to their Department Head tours, or the sequential route where motherhood follows employment.

B. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the data obtained from the interviews with the female junior officers and a comparison with the results of the 2001 Surface Warfare Junior Officer retention survey and literature from *Proceedings* magazine, the concerns that the female officers expressed are similar to the concerns expressed on the survey and in the literature regarding Surface Warfare junior officer retention. The most common negative factors that are influencing the female junior officers to leave the Navy are quality of life issues, most notably the vast amount of time junior officers spend on the job, lack of confidence in senior leadership, and family concerns. These concerns are common to the concerns of all junior officers in the community. Of particular note however, is the perception or opinion that female junior officers have regarding family planning. Most of the junior officers do not feel that they have the flexibility to plan a family during the normal career progression for a Surface Warfare Officer. Based on the biological aspects of having children, the aspect of planning and starting a family is significantly different for female officers than for male officers.

It is reassuring to note however, that although the issues affecting retention are serious and need to be addressed by the senior leadership in the Navy, it appears that their male counter parts in the community echo the majority of the concerns voiced by the female junior officers. In Keegan's thesis, *Study of Factors Affecting the Retention Decisions of Sea-Going Female Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers*, she found that women in the aviation community "felt that they had to perform better than their male counterparts just to seem 'half as good'; they felt pressured to stand as role models for other women" and that they had to cope with "(1) negative stereotypes about their abilities; (2) being the 'first' or 'only' female in a job setting; (3) being given typically 'female' or non-competitive jobs; (4) feeling compelled to 'fit in'; and (5) feeling discriminated against because of their gender." (Keegan 1999, 97) This did not appear to be the case for female junior officers in the Surface Warfare Community. Although

the female junior officers typically encountered various forms of discrimination or harassment, they did not feel that that was a strong negative influence or that it was an issue that they could not overcome. Many of the female junior officers felt that the process of integrating female into ships could have been run in a smoother fashion, but the fact that the majority of the gender issues voiced by females in the aviation community are not echoed by females in the Surface Community lends to the notion that, although the process of integration could have been smoother, the community has done an exceptional job with achieving gender equality in the officer ranks. The primary issue that stands out as a notable difference between the females and males in the community is the issue of family planning.

In conclusion, the most notable negative factors contributing to the attrition of female junior officers from the Navy are quality of life issues, particularly time allocation, lack of faith in senior leadership, and desire to have a family. The main reasons that the senior officers interviewed stayed in the Navy was due to job satisfaction, their love for being out at sea and ship driving, and their commitment to taking advantage of the opportunities that opened to them and forging a path for the women who followed.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Navy Needs to Focus Immediately on the Issue of Leadership

Even though Navy publications, such as *Proceedings*, are rife with articles disclosing the insufficient leadership in the Surface Warfare Community, the Navy does not seem to be making changes to improve the leadership. Hatten and Horton propose that a CNO advisory group be established to identify key quality of life issues and potential solutions to improve life in the Navy. (Hatten and Horton 1998) The same initiative could be applied to leadership. By delving into the issues, *and* offering solutions to senior leaders, the conditions of the Navy and the trust that junior officers have in their superiors may improve. Additionally, the Navy should establish a standardized 360-degree feedback process at the unit level. If captains of Navy ships are able to receive feedback firsthand from their junior and mid-grade officers, they may be

more apt to continue building on their positive leadership attributes and also improve facets that their subordinates feel could be better. This would personalize the flaws and successes of leadership that have become broad generalizations in the various articles in Navy publications.

2. The Navy Should be More Flexible in the Career Path of Surface Warfare Officers to Make It Easier for Women to Accommodate a Career and Family

As Natter, Lopez and Hodges note, the composition of the junior officer force is significantly different than it was 20 years ago. Twenty-years ago, 30 percent of the officer corps was married. Today, roughly 70 percent of the officer corps is married. (Natter, Lopez and Hodges 1998, 58) As such, the need to balance family issues impacts more officers now than it did 20 years ago. Segal notes, “The more the military services adapt to family needs, the more committed will be both service members and families to the institution.” (Segal 1986, 34) Many of the female junior officers interviewed are leaving the Navy because they want to start a family and they do not believe that they can be successful as both department heads and mothers. They also do not feel that they can plan a family operating under the rigid and established career path of a Surface Warfare Officer.

Policies pertaining to childcare and family planning need to be addressed in order for the Navy to create an environment suitable to retaining its highly trained female professionals who are dealing with competing priorities. One initiative that could curb the exodus of female Surface Warfare Officers who feel that competing priorities of a military career and family are not compatible would be the adoption of a program similar to the Coast Guard Care For Newborn Children (CNC). The program allows officers and enlisted members of the Coast Guard, both male and female, the option of a one time leave of absence for up to two years to care for their newborn child or legally adopted newborn child. While on CNC, members receive no pay, allowance, benefits or retirement points. Additionally, officers lose precedence on the active duty promotion list and enlisted personnel are removed from advancement lists. During the separation, members may participate in the Reserves. At any point during the two-year period, a

member can request to return to active duty. As of June 1999, 244 personnel separated under the CNC program. The pool consisted of 133 women and 111 men. Of the 175 that have completed their two years in the program, 82 have returned to active duty, a return rate of 46.9 percent. This pool consisted of 47 women and 35 men. (Coast Guard CNC Presentation)

Through adoption of a pilot program similar to the Coast Guard's CNC, the Navy would be providing flexibility in the career paths of its sailors and officers. This would provide a great deal of backing to the Navy's professed commitment and dedication to the family. It would also alleviate some of the stress that accompanies the perceived need for the Navy's members to choose between family and a career in the service.

D. FURTHER RESEARCH

Although numerous themes were garnered from the interviews and many of the themes are supported by retention surveys administered throughout the community, the data should not be used to predict the retention decisions for all females in the community. The sample size of female officers interviewed was relatively small, and numerous changes and events have occurred since the interviews were conducted that may further impact retention in the community. The following are potential areas for further research:

1. Conduct a Statistical Analysis of Retention in the Surface Warfare Community

Since women have been afforded the same career path as men in the Surface Warfare Community for the past 10 years, a statistical analysis of retention in the community would provide results as to how the women fair in regards to promotion and retention. There is no known study that would provide these results. In the Surface Warfare Community, females comprise 25 percent of the entering class at Surface Warfare Division Officer School. (Surface Warfare Community Manager 2001) This is a significant change for the community, as the percentage of females never topped five percent for any year prior to 1995. Since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Law in

1991 and the assignment of women to combatants in 1993, women have the same career path and opportunities for promotion as men. A statistical analysis of retention would provide insight into the gender composition of the community at numerous points in the career, to include Department Head School and at the ten- year point.

2. Analyze Results of the Junior Officer Retention Survey with a Breakdown of the Responses by Gender

Since many of the responses from the female junior officers interviewed correlated to responses obtained from the 2001 Junior Officer Retention Survey, the data from the survey should be studied to clearly represent the issues that junior officers are facing regarding retention. The response rate for the survey was 41 percent (2113 of 5142). The data from the survey would provide for a fair representation of the community and a much larger cross-section. A study analyzing the data could appropriately draw conclusions regarding the community, the issues that all junior officers face, and certain gender-specific issues, if they do in fact exist.

3. Analyze the Elasticity of Retention Supply Curves in the Surface Warfare Officer Corps Using Warner and Goldberg's Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model

Warner and Goldberg analyze the reenlistment rate of Navy enlisted personnel based on various pecuniary and non-pecuniary "taste factors." (Warner and Goldberg 1984) An example of Surface Warfare Officer retention should be applied to and analyzed using this model. This could provide valuable insight into the major non-pecuniary "taste factors" impacted the junior officers in the community.

Clearly, retention is an important issue that must be addressed in the Surface Warfare Community. Wooldridge asserts "if you give good junior officers opportunities to have fun, in a culture willing to confront problems and take care of its own they will stay." (Wooldridge 1998, 82) Being able to retain sufficient numbers of quality female junior officers is vital to the success of the community as well as the readiness of the fleet. The Navy needs to do everything that it can to provide an environment and

opportunities that will foster increased retention to ensure that the quality junior officers of today will be around to serve as the eminent captains for the Navy of tomorrow.

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APPENDIX A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER PATH



CAPT	24	---	Major Command
	22	---	
	20	---	Shore tour (Joint, major staff,...) or Afloat Staff / RO
CDR	18	---	CDR Command
	16	---	
	14	---	Shore tour (Joint, major staff, acquisition,...) or Afloat Staff / Complex tour
LCDR	12	---	XO Tour
	10	---	
	8	---	Shore tour (Joint, Subspecialty, Training Cmd,...) or Afloat Staff / Complex tour
LT	6	---	Second Department Head Tour
	4	---	First Department Head Tour
	2	---	
LTJG	0	---	Shore tour (NPGS, Aide, SWOS inst...)
ENS		---	Second Division Officer Tour
		---	First Division Officer Tour

From Surface Warfare Officer Community Manager Brief

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**APPENDIX B. DATE OF INTERVIEW BY LOCATION AND RANK
OF INTERVIEWEE**

DATE OF INTERVIEW	LOCATION	RANK
05 FEB 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
08 FEB 01	Washington, DC	CAPT
09 FEB 01	Washington, DC	CDR
12 FEB 01	Newport, RI	LT
12 FEB 01	Newport, RI	LT
12 FEB 01	Newport, RI	LT
13 FEB 01	Newport, RI	LT
14 FEB 01	Newport, RI	CDR
20 FEB 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
20 FEB 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
21 FEB 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
21 FEB 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
23 FEB 01	Washington, DC	CAPT
01 MAR 01	Washington, DC	CAPT
06 MAR 01	Washington, DC	CDR
07 MAR 01	Annapolis, MD	CDR
08 MAR 01	Washington, DC	CDR
09 MAR 01	Annapolis, MD	LT
13 MAR 01	Virginia Beach, VA	LT
13 MAR 01	Norfolk, VA	LT
13 MAR 01	Virginia Beach, VA	LT
14 MAR 01	Norfolk, VA	LCDR
14 MAR 01	Norfolk, VA	CDR
14 MAR 01	Norfolk, VA	CDR
15 MAR 01	Norfolk, VA	LCDR
15 MAR 01	Virginia Beach, VA	LTjg
16 MAR 01	Virginia Beach, VA	LT

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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

SENIOR OFFICER QUESTIONS

1. Tell me about your decision to join the military. Why did you choose the Navy? Surface Warfare? What other options did you have?
2. What did your family and friends think about your decision? Who influenced your decision to join the Navy? To choose Surface Warfare?
3. Tell me briefly about the platforms that you have served on and the billets that you have had. Why did you choose the various platforms?
4. What about your tours influenced you in a positive way? in a negative way?
5. Tell me briefly about your shore tours. What about your tours influenced you in a positive way? in a negative way?
6. Tell me about the peak experience or high point in your career so far.
7. What have been the major stressors or low points for you in your career?
8. Where were you in your training track when the combat exclusion law was rescinded? Did this affect your career path?
9. What does your commitment to the Navy mean to you? What motivates you to serve in the Navy?
10. Do you feel that your commitment to the Navy or your career as a Surface Warfare Officer has changed since women have been allowed on combatant vessels? In what ways has it changed?
11. Was the Navy everything that you expected it to be? Is it still? How have the conditions of the service, with regards to females, changed over the past few years or since you first began your career? Have the changes been for the better or worse?
12. Do you feel in any way that you give more to the Navy than you get in return? Or that sometimes you are not able to give as much as you would like?
13. Do you feel that you get the appropriate recognition for what you do? What types of recognition have you received, and which have been the most meaningful for you?

14. Tell me about your relationship/interaction with past superiors, subordinates, peers, other female officers, and female spouses.
15. Have you encountered gender discrimination/harassment in the Navy? What impact did that have on you?
16. Do you feel, as a SWO, that you have any positive female role models to look up to? What attributes do they possess that make them a role model for you?
17. At what point did you decide that you were going to make the Navy a career?
18. What were some of the factors that contributed to your decision to making the Navy a career?
19. Do you feel that you have made any sacrifices choosing a career in the Navy?
20. How have you been able to balance having a family with a career in the Surface Navy?

JUNIOR OFFICER QUESTIONS

1. Tell me about your decision to join the military. Why did you choose the Navy? Surface Warfare? What other options did you have?
2. What did your family and friends think about your decision? Who influenced your decision to join the Navy? To choose Surface Warfare?
3. Tell me briefly about the platforms that you have served on and the billets that you have had. Why did you choose the various platforms?
4. What about your tours influenced you in a positive way? in a negative way? What have been the main challenges that you've had to face?
5. How long did it take you to qualify?
6. Tell me briefly about your shore tours? What about your tours influenced you in a positive way? In a negative way?
7. Tell me about the peak experience or high point in your career so far?
8. What have been the major stressors or low points for you in your career?
9. What does your commitment to the Navy mean to you? What motivates you to serve in the Navy? Has anything impacted/changed your commitment to the Navy?

10. Was the Navy everything that you expected it to be? Is it still?
11. Do you feel in any way that you give more to the Navy than you get in return? Or that sometimes you are not able to give as much as you would like?
12. Do you feel that you get the appropriate recognition for what you do? What types of recognition have you received, and which have been the most meaningful for you?
13. Tell me about your relationship/interaction with past superiors, subordinates, peers, other female officers, and female spouses.
14. Have you encountered gender discrimination/harassment in the Navy? What impact did that have on you?
15. Do you feel, as a SWO, that you have any positive female role models to look up to? What attributes do they possess that make them a role model to you?
16. Have you thought about whether you are going to stay in the Navy or get out?
17. What are some of the factors that affect your decision to stay or go?
18. If you decided to get out, what would have to happen to make you stay? What could the Navy do differently to make you stay in?
19. Has the SWO Bonus impacted your decision to stay or go?
20. If you are planning on leaving, what do you plan on doing? What do you think you will get that you don't feel you can get in the Navy?
21. If family is a big concern, what concerns do you have about balancing a family and a career in the Navy? What could the Navy do to make it possible to do both?

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APPENDIX D. DEMOGRAPHIC WORKSHEET

Rank:

Age:

Siblings (Gender and Age):

Family members in/were in military (Relationship/Service/Job/Years of Service):

Commissioning source and year:

College and Major:

Additional education:

Former enlisted (service and years):

Platforms served on (include billets):

Marital status at service entry:

Number of children at service entry:

Present marital status:

Number of children at present:

Military spouse:

Occupation of spouse:

Personal awards:

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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

RANK	FREQUENCY
LTjg	1
LT	14
LCDR	2
CDR	7
CAPT	3

	SENIOR OFFICERS	JUNIOR OFFICERS
MILITARY FAMILY	8	11
COMMISSIONING SOURCE:		
OCS	4	3
ROTC	4	4
USNA	4	8
PRIOR ENLISTED SERVICE	1	1
COLLEGE MAJOR:		
TECHNICAL	3	5
NON-TECHNICAL	9	10
PLATFORM HISTORY:		
COMBATANT	5	11
(CG/DDG/DD/FFT/FFG)	0	5
AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CV/CVN)	3	5
AMPHIBIOUS (LSD/LHA...)	12	0
AUXILIARY		
(AE/AOE/AD/AVT/AR/AO/AD)		
CURRENT MARITAL STATUS:		
MARRIED	6	6
SINGLE/DIVORCED	6	9
MILITARY SPOUSE	1	4
WOMEN WITH CHILDREN	3	2

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APPENDIX F. DATA TEMPLATES

Senior Officers:

Reason for entry:
Positive influence of sea tours:
Negative influence of sea tours:
Peak experience:
Major stressors:
Repeal of Combat Exclusion:
Commitment to the Navy:
Expectations of the Navy:
Recognition:
Relationship with superiors/subordinates/peers:
Discrimination/harassment:
Role models:
Career decision:
Sacrifices:
Family concerns:

Junior Officers:

Reason for entry:
Positive influence of sea tours:
Negative influence of sea tours:
Peak experience:
Major stressors:
Commitment:
Motivation:
Expectations:
Recognition:
Relationship with superiors/subordinates/peers:
Discrimination/harassment:
Role models:
Mentors:
Stay/Go:
Factors in career decision:
Navy changes to impact decision:
SWO Bonus:
Career aspirations:
Family concerns:

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